Royce's criticism of realistic and pragmatic epistemology by Bearden, Elmer Holmes
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1944









ROYCE'S CRITICISM OE RS^.LISTIC
AND PRAGMATIC EPISTEMOLOGY
Elmer Holmes Bearden
(A.B., Mississipni Collesre, 1942)
-submitted in nartial fulfilment of the













•j/j •f( *r'’r i
'
‘o^ K- :-i .J- • j ‘^'



















I. THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION 0^ TERMS USED .... 1
1. The pro'bleTTi and ntirnosa 1
2. Major sources of material 2
3. Definition of terms used 2
i. Realistic eui stemolop-y 2
I
ii. Praermatic euis temolos-y 4
4. Orffani^ation of remainder of thesis 4
IT. THE INTER-RELATIONS OP REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC
EPISTEMOLOGY 6
1. Revolt against idealism ... 6
2, The object in knowledge 7
i. Realistic version 8
ii. Subjectivistic version 10
iii. Meaning in urap-matism and realism ... 11
iv. Miscellaneous inter-relations 12
III. ROYCE’S CRITICISM OP REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY . . 14
1. Uniqueness of criticism 14
2. His dialectic 15
i. Essential features of realistic view . , 15
ii. Statement of its exact logical force . . 17
iii. Apulication of test of consistency to
its ultimate conseouence 20
iv. Consideration of its modified forms 24

3. Restilt of dialectic 26
i. Im'DossT'hil ity of !) inicaere of independent
rea] s by a third fact 26
ii. Impossibility of existence of common
characteristics in independent reals. , 26
iii. Impossibility of world of Many or One . 27
iv. Impossibility of any relation of
realistic epistemological view to
world 27
^STIMTi^lS ROYOy^S CRITICISM OTJ» RIi«IISTTC
DPISTRMOIOGY 28
1. Unfavorable 28
i. Estimate of Perry 28
(1) Royce*s definition of realism ... 29
(2) Royoe*s idea of independence. ... 31
(3) Realism and Pluralism 33
(4) Perry ^s theory of independence. . . 36
ii . Estimate of Uri scoll 46
iii. Estimate of Roffers 46
iv. Estimate of Pratt 48
V. Estimate of Peirce 49
vi . Estimate of Montaerue 50
2. Favorable 53
i. Estimate of Howison 53
ii. Estimate of Cunnins:ham 54

























































3. ?1rial evslnatlon of the critletsm 5B
V, CT^TT'I'CTSM n-5» T>T?»^T'ird tth '^'ptST^KOT OOv, , ,59
1
. CriticiSTn of s’eneral view of praf?Tne tiSTn, , ,60
i, T''^e PTiri t of TreffTna ti am ,60
ii. Need for com-oanionshiT) : .63
iii. Need of something valuable as a stand-
ard 64
8 , Criticism of instrumentalism 67
i. Inadenuacy in renor tins' facts of
history of science 67
ii. Inability of a person to exuerience
success of another 68
3, Criticism of Jar*’as' -nraemiatism 68
i. James* definition of truth 68
ii. E'^’uerience of loyalty 69
iii. Inadequacy of exnediency as a defin-
ition of truth 69
iv, Eri stance of whole of human experience .70
V. Existence of "long-run” 70
vi , Failure of prae-matism to s^ive "cash" . .73
VI. ESTIMATE Ot? R0YCE*S CPTTTCTSM 013» PPA.GMATTC
EPTSTEMOIOCy 7?>
1, Criticism of p-eneral view of pragmatism. . .78
i. Need for companion shin 78





















2, Criticism of in strrmental ism. ...... .79
i. Inftdeonacy in renortinff the facts of
history of science .• .79
ii. Inability of nerson to exnerience the
snccess of another 83
3. Criticism of James* praffmatism 85
i. ‘Experience of loyalty 85
ii. Tnadeq.pacy of expediency as a
definition of truth 86
iii. Existence of hnman exnerienee as a
whole 86
iv. Existence of ”]ong-run’* 87
V. Pailnre of prae:matism to lerive **eash”. .87
CFA.PTER
VTT. AUD C<‘'NCT.TTST0N8 88
-il
r i ' i I ' ' «






















TH?] PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OP TERMS USED
1. THE PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
The T>tirT5oS0 of this thesis is to evaluate Josiah Royce’s
criticism of realistic and nraffmatic eoisteraoloery. If Royce^s
criticism is valid, realistic e-oistemoloe-y is imootent as an
exnlanation of the knawled^e relation and nraffmatic eoisteraoloe-y
to say the least, erives an inadeouate account of truth and re-
auires suonlementinff
.
The validity of Royce’s criticism of realism stands or
falls with the answer to the followiner Question: Does the re-
la tionshiu of indeoendence between idea and obiect imuly an ab-
solute and mutual indeoendence? The realist says that the ob-
,1ect is Indenendent of the idea, but claims that the idea is
1
deuendent on the object, Royce contends that lo^ic demands
absolute and mutual indeoendence rei?ardless of how the realist
tries to modify the relationship. The evaluation will be made
aith the helo of orevious favorable and unfavorable estimates.
Royce 's oriraary objection to orapmiatic eoi stemoloery is
that it is inadeouate in defining what truth is. He holds that
the oraprraatist must refer to some standard in order to be con-
sistent, In the case of pragmatism the ar^ment is not so uni-
fied as in the case of realism, but oractically all of the
iifferent arguments are an oute-rowth of the General objection
1. Perry, Art, (190?), 451.
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mentioned above. Since Royce^s criticism of -nrae-matism has
not received the e-reat amonnt o'P attention «?iven the criticism
of realism, the evaluation will not be so well s-unnorted by
other estimates.
2. MJOR SOURCES OF MATERIAL
Royce's criticism of realistic enistemoloffy is found en-
tirely in the first Series of his Gifford lectures, contained
in The World and the Individual. Vol. I. The most systematic
renlies to the criticism are found inR. B. Perry's "‘‘Professor
Royce's Refutation of Realism and Pluralism" and in W. P.
Montague's "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism." Other
treatments have been minor ones.
Royce's criticism of urae’matism is found in three sources
his presidential address to the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation, "The Eternal and the Practical"; The Philosophy of
Loyalty; his address to the International Conerress of Philo-
sophy at Heidelberer, in September, 1808, published in Wi lliam
James and Other E s says . The boolcs used larp-ely in evaluation
are: James, The Meaning of Tru th and Pragma ti sm ; Bawden, The
Princiules of Pragmatism ; Hoc king, T7^r>e3 of Philosophy ; Lr^ke
Invitation to Philosophy ; and Pratt, What Is Pragmatism.
3. DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
i. Realistic epistemology. According to Royce realistic
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be independent of an idea or eTnerienoe thron<?b which the real
being- is, from withont, felt, or thought, or Known, and that
this independence is the rerv essence of the reality. This
definition, as will later be shown, is not altogether accept-
able to the realist. Hoctcing states in a more satisfactory
manner that realism is:
^1) primarily a way of Knowing, a variant of
rationalism ronghly describable as a preferential
confidence in analytic reason; and that this way
of knowing carries with it (?) a metaphysical be-
lief that the objects we observe are in reality
independent of ns, and of each other, essentiallv
as they appear to be.^
It is the second phase of his definition that pertains to
Hoyce*s study. Realistic epistemology is the theory of know-
ledge which maintains that the existence of the known object is
independent of the knowing idea. Perry states that reality is
a "datum, a somewhat that is given independently of whatever
4
ideas may be formed about it." The real has a locus, a habitai
,
whether or not within some individual experience. The real is
regardless of what names, relations, secondary meanings, or
ideas may be referred to it. The realist conceives of a thing
and the thought of a thing, each members of two orders. The
thing of the first order is indifferent, as far as its being is
5




3. Hocking, TP, 330.
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4ii. Pragmatic eT)i gtemol opy . ~ In this rarer it is rrag-
matic erist0moloe:y as a theory of truth that is considered.
Pragmatic eristeraology states that an idea is true when it
works: "that is, when it is successfri
,
when it fulfills its
6
function, or rerforms what is demanded o'^ it." The test of
truth of all thinkinpr is to he found in its rractical conse-
7
ouences. Royce states that the sum and substance of the
theory is that the truth of an idea is "determined hy its * suc-
cess’ in yielding what my colleague (James) calls the ’cash
values in terras of exrerience’ which arrear as conseouences of
8
holding the idea."
4. ORIANTZATTOR OF R^KIATNP^ OF THFSIS
The next charter will be concerned with a study of the
inter-relations of realism and pragmatism. It is possible
that the criticism of one may rertain to the other. The third
charter will be an exposition of Royce’s criticism of realism
and will be followed by a charter dealing with the validity of
the criticism. The evaluation will take into account various
previous estimates of the criticism, favorable and unfavorable.
The fifth charter will be an exposition of Royce’s criticism of
pragmatism. The sixth will be a direct evaluation of each of
his obiections to pragmatism. Because his criticism of prag-
matism has received little attention, few previous estimates
are available. Thus in this evaluation it will be necessary to
6. Perry, PPT, 204.
7. Brightman, I"’’, 51.
8. Royce, PI, 3?2-2?5.
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proceed directly to the lopricel issues, TV's final chanter will
he a summary of the material and a nresentation of the conclu-
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TFF TNT^P-RT?TJlTTOFS Ri^IAITSTTC AND PR^f^MTTC
^PTSTI^MOLOGY
A stTJdy of the inter-relations of realistic and T)rafirm8tic
|
eni stemol op’y is difficult hecanse of the a’Ti'biffnity of the term
"rraermatic eni steraolos'y”. Whereas realistic eni stemoloffv may
he acctirately associated with the thesis of inderendence of oh-
.iect and idea, -pragmatic epistemology, as has been rreviopsly
stated, does not Teadily lend itself to spmmary definition.
There is actpally no pragmatic epi stemoloery, hnt rather praa'-
matic epi steraoloffies. The general definition firivan in chapter
one, which will be used in this discussion, may be, conseouently
subject to various interure tati. ons . With few definite and clear
cut issues, it is dangerous to state conclusive inter-relation-
ships. In fact, the inter-relations seem to hingre on the par-
ticular interpretation ^iven to pra^rraatism and not on any arbi-
trary and inherent relationships. There are, to he sure, strijc-
InR similarities. It is only in a limited sense, however, that
pragrmatic epistemology may be said to be realistic.
1 . RFVOT.T AfJATNST IDF.ALTF5M
1
Both realism and pragmatism are hostile to the
Hereafter the words ^urae-matism* and ^realism^ win sub-
stitute for ’uraematic epistemolop’y* and ^realistic epis
temolopy* respectively.
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•universal absol'ute of idealism and hold that snch a doctrine
is the resT7lt of acce-otin^ the fallacious oost'ulate that "to
2
he is to he nerceived", ’raffmatism^ in fact, arose as a revolt
against an ahsol'utism which eliminated the possibility of er-
ror and which was so interested in the Ahsolnte that it en-
tirely forgot humanity. The pragmatist completely eliminates
absolutism and has the cooperation of the realist in doing so.
The realist, however-, lets absolutism into his real and inde-
3
pendent world under the disguise of subsistential entities.
The primary ob lection of realism, however, is to the sub.iect-
ivistic extremes into which idealism has fallen, rather than
to absolutism.
2. THE OH.teCT TN KN0V?IEDGE
It may be said in general that pragmatism is realistic
in so far as it intends a world beyond man*s finite cognitive
4
purposes. Boardman contends that there is perfect agreement
between pragmatism and realism concerning the cognitive re-
ference to a world apart from experience and that the one
controversial issue between the two views is in concern of the
place of meaning in experience. In regard to the metaphysical
status of the knowledge process pragmatism divides itself into
realistic and sub .I’ectivi stic versions.
2. Boardman SM, 13.
3. Boardman SMP, 14,
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i. Reslistic version. Knowledge for all nracTnatl sts is
a cormoleT consisting of an idea, an object, and a relation of
verification between the two. The realistic nraernatist states
that the varions comnonents are independent of their Places in
the process. They are not conditioned by being fonnd in Icnow-
ledffe. The sensible parts of na tnre are to him the termini to
which ideas lead, bPt the facts need not be related to the
ideas in order to be-. Knowledpre is a form of adaptation to a
5
preexi stiner environment. James and a nnmber of other prasr-
matists so believe.
James states:
I start with two things, the ob.lective facts and
the claims, and indicate which claims, the facts
being there, will wor^ success^lly as the latter*
s
substitute and which will not.®
Dewey states:
The position taken in the essays is frankly realistic
in acknowledging that certain brute existences, de-
tected or laid bare by thinking but in no way con-
stituted out of thought or any mental process, set
every problem for reflection and hence serve to test
its otherwise merely speculative results.'
The instrumentalist* s theory definitely presupposes an
ob,1ective world which exists independently of human cognitive
experience and which antedates that experience.
The notion of thought as having evolved as a useful in-
strument or orffan of adaptation necessarily implies a world
5. Perry, PPT, P14.
6. James MT, xix.
7. Dewey, ^S, 35.
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or TAin^able ob.iacts to which thoncrht adaots itself. Needs
tell the individual where, when, and how raueh to use various
instruments, hut the nature of the oh.iect on which the in-
8
strument is to he used determines the how. A realist may he
9
an instrumentalist and an instrumentalist must he a realist.
Humanism, which contends that the known world is deter-
mined largely hy suecifically human faculties, that these fac-
ulties and functions- are determined hy emotions, desires, and
needs, and that the known world is the real world without any
distortion, may he realistic or not, in accordance with the in-
teruretation given. If it is interureted as meaning that cog-
nition is selective and that reality has a rich variety of as-
pects from which are chosen those which best meet human needs,
10
then humanism is realistic.
The interpretation which Clarence Lewis gives pragmatism
is definitely realistic. In fact, pragmatic realism seems to
he a more accurate term for the theory which he advances than
the term pragmatism. Lewis states that the practical situation
implies hrute fact, something given as one element, and a human
being with certain needs. He points out the realm of mathemat-
ics, a realm quite independent of sense experience, as typical
11
of the independent element in knowledge. In knowledge there is
an element of conceptual interpretation, theoretically always
separable from an application to experience and capable of being
8. Montaerue, Art. ri909) 486-487.
9. Ibid., 490.
10. Ibid. 567.
11. Lewis, Art. (1926), 222.
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stnalda in Alsstrad^Ion. Tliotiglit*s purpose is to function be-
[
tween this independent ^iven and the interests of the individ- !
12 '
ual. The driven sets the problem for interpretation.




of pragmatism identifies the components of knowledge altogether
|
with their place in that system. The object is either fact^
idea, “funded" belief, where these are defined as terms in the l
pragmatic process of .verification. Vifhatever is known is what
i
13
jit is, its character and reality, due to its being known.
Humanism is more naturally given this subjectivistic in-
1
terpretation. Schiller designates as incapable of rational de-
fense or proofs the assumption that the Real has a determinate
nature which knowing reveals but does not affect so that know-
14
ing makes no difference to it.
Psychological pragmatism declares that the truth relation
of agreement consists in being experienced. Therefore, truth
eouals proof or verification. This theory, identifying truth
with those experiences of successful leading by means of which
truth is sometimes verified, is anti-realistic ; for it makes
15
the esse of the truth relation consist in its percipi.
Montague states that logical pragmatism has no necessary
implication for or against realism. The pragmatic criterion




!§. Lewis, Art. Tl^eT,
13. Perry, PPT, 215-
14. Montague, Art. (1909), 562; Perrv, PPT, 215-
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3. MEAUING IK PRAGMATISM AND REALISM
For the realist the mind has no nart to nlay in living
meaning to objects in exnerience. The meanings of objects are
in the objects and the mind nassively becomes aware of that
16
meaning as the movement of a system. (Perry is not a good
realist at this noint for he designates meaning and value as
17
denendent relations.) When the realist insists that object-
ive nronosi tions have any meaning apart from the nrocess of
exuerience, or anart from human uuruoses, the pragmatist
chooses to uart company with him. The pragmatist contends
that the fallacy of the realist lies in his interesting himself
so much in the object of science that he overlooks the import-
ance of method. Por the pragmatist, needs and puruoses of the
individual supuly meaning to the object.
The comuarison of the concentions of knowledge in the two
views throws some light on the significance of meaning. Real-
ists and nragroattsts have both agreed that the percentual know-
ledge of the scientist must be recognized as valid. They fall
18
out over the definition of the percept. Knowledge for the
realist is simply a matter of becoming aware of a proposition;
it is immediate recognition or uerception of an object. Know-
ledge for the pragmatist is the result of inouiry; the object of
knowledge is the end toward which thought is directed in solv-
ing a -problem. Perception is not knowledge for the nragmatist;
~
~r^. BoardSan'/ SMP7~30.
17. Perry, Art, (1918).
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it simply sets the problem for knowledge, hnt does not itself
constitute knowledge. Knowledge comes as the result of the
19
resolution of a problematic situation.
Since knowledge is not the same for the two, the realist’s
statement that knowledge makes no difference to its object does
not contradict the statement of the pragmatist that knowledge
does make a difference to its object. Knowledge for the prasr-
matist is not just knowing, but knowing how to do something.
An aot does not reach completion until it is carried out in act-
ion. Thought is simply an instrument to conduct. Because the
realist sets up immediate apprehension as knowledge, he is
quite right in maintaining that knowledge makes no difference
20
to the object known. Object and meaning exist apart from be-
ing known according to realists. The object exists apart from
being known according to the realist, but meaning is supplied bj
the interests and purposes of the individual or the demands of
a problem. The pragmatist accuses the realist of abstracting
meaninsr from the interest relation between the knower and known
and setting up the abstraction as an external object apart from
all relations. The realist accuses the pragmatist of finding
meaning in the known object apart from all relations and sotting
it UP as a result of the activity of the knower.
4. MTSCBLIANT50US INTBR-RELATIONS
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their eristemoloerical' doc trines. The process verification is
seen, in the lipht of monism, to he a leading to the object it-
self, while the realistic analysis is an analysis of the object
81
itself. The pragmatist tends, however, to emphasize the sub-
jective aspect of the neutral stuff while the neo-realists em-
phasize the objective feature. Both hold that error is the
failure of the self to define the stimulus of knowledge ef-
82
fectively. Both believe in the theory of external relations.
Thus it may be concluded that the criticism of realism
will in many resuects be a criticism of •oraffmatisra.
81. Bri^btman, IP, 77
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CH^PTISR TII
R0YC?1*S CRITICISM OP REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY
The statement of the problem, and the definition of real-
istic epistemology, and the treatment of its relationship to
pragmatic epistemology having been presented, the gronnd is noT«
prepared for the consideration of Royce*s criticism of realis-
tic epistemology.
1. UNIOUENESS OP CRITICISM
1
Royce*s criticism of realistic epistemology, one of his
most valuable contributions to philosophy, is unique in at
least two reSToects:
i . Centering of discussion around the idea. In the
first place, this criticism is unioue because of its relation-
shin to the unioue method adopted by the author in the whole
thought process recorded in The World and the Individual . The
originality spoken of refers to the special way in which the
"nature of the cognitive idea and its relation to Being are
handled, the attempt to center the whole discussion about the
2
idea as such." Royce takes a single conception, that of Reinl
and follows it through its various forms, making it an instru-
ment of criticism and construction, the discussion of the
realistic conception of Being, Royce transforms into a
r. Royce, WI, I,' 47-77“91rl38. All
references in this chapter refer to
Royce WI, I unless otherwise noted.
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discussion of the cognitive idea, Royce sirauly leads realistic
euistemolopry aloner to its logical conseauences in its attempt
to link idea and Being and merely exposes its contradictions,
|
The criticism of realism is latent in its own conceutions; the
seeds of its destruction are in its own constitution,
ii. Using of criticism for constructive purpose. In the
second place, the criticism is not criticism for its own sake
or simply for the discovery of untruth, but is a preparatory
3
stage for Royce* s own view. He, indeed, does not attempt to
tear down realistic epistemology merely to show the superiority
of his own view. He is seeking for the truth of realism rather
than for its error. His effort to prove realism's innate ab-
surdity is, in part, to clear the way for the reduction of the
4
external to the internal meaning of the idea. In arriving at
his own conception of Being, Royce criticizes all major views,
discovers the truths in them, and synthesizes them in the form-
5
ation of his own view,
2, HIS DIALT5CTIC
i, Essential features of realistic view. The first task
which Royce undertakes in preparing for the criticism is a
statement of the essential features of the view under consider-
ation, a definition which will include all realists and which
3. Perry, Art, (1902), 449.
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irill be true to the spirit of realism. According to realism,
to be real means to be independent of an idea or experience




This mere definition of realism serves as a herald of
Royce*e method. His definition foretells that his method is
that of reflection of thought, philosophy's self-criticism, and
7
that the real end of the discussion is a locrical one. He
1
states the definition in epistemological terms. His criticism
even of metaphysical theory is based on a consideration of the
relation of reality to the knowing process. Royce holds that:
When you ask the auestion: What is an Idea?
and: How can Ideas stand in any true relation to
Reality? you attack the world knot in the way 8
that promises most for the untying of the meshes.
With this simple definition of realism as a starting point,
Royce takes a step more directly in the epistemological directioij
ts he investigates the relation which realism assumes between
knowledge and its real ob.iect. He states that it is a relation '
which will make no difference to the real object which is al-
tocrether indifferent to being known or not bein^ known. The •
1
Independent and the real are one. If all knowledge were to
i
vanish, the only necessary change occurring in the real world
irould be the conseouence that the particular fact known as the i
9 i
existence of knowledge would, by hypothesis, be gone, 1
_g_ 6^: “
7. Perry, Art. (1902), 446. '
8. 16.
9, 63.
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To be certain that his statement of the essential features
j
10
of realistic epistemoloery is fair, Royee elucidates and insti-i
1
fies it by anpealin^ to historical examples. He seeics for the
one essential featnre that lies at the base of these historical
examples, pushing aside the countless accidental features and
the more or less controversial issues which detract from the
11
fundamental issue. He explores the sometimes ouoted definitionj
that reality is "extra-mental^ or "outside of mind" and finds
IR
both inadecuate to express the meaning of the realist. He
oomes aerain to say that realistic epistemology is a sundering
of the what and the that.
With the issue simplified, the realistic definition seems
plausible and familiar. The common-sense statement that cer-
tain facts exist "whether or no" seems to find proof in the
technically abstract expression in the fundamental definition
of systematic realism as stated. On the other hand, the defin-
ition is mysterious and baffling as soon as one undertaices to
1
formulate an exact account of the way in which Beiner is independ-
13
jnt of ioiowledere . The next step is concerned with the attempt
^t formulating an exact account of this independence.
ii. Statement of its exact logical force. Royce, buildinflr
iipon his definition of realistic epistemology, develops, in a
series of formal propositions, realism* s inevitable conseouences
1
10. Royce has defined realism as an epistemological theory.
In fact, when he uses the term realism, he is thinking
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to see where they lead the realist. The first avestion to he
answered is: In what sense is the reality to he indenendent of
the knowing nrocess? The Mathematical Theory of Prohahility,
|
snoposedly offering an example of inderendence
,
cannot illus-
trate the absolute indenendenee spoken of by realism. It merely
means that while two events are not wholly indenendent
,
either
because one does not know what the independence is, or because
knowing, one ignores some asuect of the interdependence as 1r-
14
relevant.
Because of the ambiguity of the conception, Royce finds
it necessary to view it first in its most extreme form and to
observe its conseouences. Later he considers the modification.
Per the present, therefore, he assumes that the indenendenee
sPoken of is total independence. Wh«t follows?
Two assertions seem to result from this definition. The
first assertion that realism malces concerning knowledge is that
any seeming linkage between knowledge and its object (causal
relati onshln or even agreement) is no part of the essential
nature of the object insofar as it is real or of the knowledee
Insofar as it consists of ideas. Of course, an idea depends on
Its object for its truth, but an examination of the idea does
not tell whether its real object is or is not. On the other
iand, an examination of the object does not tell whether any
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”Th9 that in a realistic world never follows from the mere
what.” There is no nossihility of di scriminatinsr trnth and
16
falsity of ideas. With this assertion as a basis, Royce
states that any linkage between idea and object, any tie of
causation, even the ideals accidental truth of its object,
will bo another fact. This fact will siranly be that causal
relation exists or that the idea, by some grood fortune, is true
of its object. Furthermore, the relation between any knower
and what he knows does not enter into the definition of the
object known, its real beine*, or the essence of the knowinj?
17
idea if it is viewed alone as an idea.
The second assertion of unmodified realism is that the
indeuendence of object over agrainst knowledge is, in its own
realm, absolute. To make this assertion more exulicit, Royce
postulates any possible object and investigates what would
follow if this possible object were real. He determines this
fact by next conceiving an idea of the object and a change
of the ideas. By virtue of the first assertion, a change in
the idea will not affect the object at all. He then concludes
that the independence must be mutual, absolute, Otherwise,
by merely examining the idea something would be proved about the
existence of the object. This proof would establish a relation-
ship which has already been defined as non-existent,
Bven as a change in the idea does not effect the definition
15. 116.
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of the real object, a change in the object does not affect the
idea, Royce may then in confidence say that the whole being: of
the object, spatial, temporal, inner and outer, and all that is
really true of it, is absolutely independent of the fact that
18
anybody knows this truth.
Now that the world of unmodified realism is clearly de-
fined, Royce invites his readers to enter "that world" and see
what is there. Could there exist Many different beings or
only One real being? Royce arbitrarily defines what he con-
siders the "one" and the "Many", If there are two objects that
are as independent of each other as the object of knowledge was
independent of any Knowledge of that object in the first de-
finition of realistic epistemology, the "Many" exist. If all
the real objects are in any way linked so as not to be mutually
19
independent, the "One" exists,
iii , Application of test of consistency to its ultimate
consequences . Two answers are open to the realist concerning
the Being of his world. Ho may decide for the Many; he may
decide for the One, Royce assumes that the realist first says
that Being is Many. Wha,l further consequences follow from this
hypothesis? Can the realist link these many things and be con-
sistent with his theory as already defined? Royce challenges
the realist to "mend the broken crystals of the Many and make
20
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In sii-Dportins: his world of the Many, the realist first
j
asks that one consult experience. Nothing seems more famil-
j
iar than the existence of really independent things, such as
"my desk" and "drops of water in the ocean." The vanishing of
one would seem to leave the other quite unchanged. What the
realist neglects to take into consideration is the possibility
of a further change that would link the two seemingly independ-
ent ob.jects.
The drop of water in the ocean, evaporated,
may enter into the atmospheric circulation, may
be carried as raoisturegjo my desk, and may there
help to warp the wood . '
The possibility of future relationship makes a part already
of the ob,i0ct*s being. Royce states emphatically that empiri-
cal ob.iects are never xnown as independent. Experience simply
P.P
shows that a certain mutual dependence may remain unobserved.
The realist may attempt to unite his Many beings by adding
a definition of something that later comes to link them togetheUi
But again, Royce disrupts the realist's poise as he reminds the
realist that he must be consistent with his definition. The
two objects have been defined as real apart from and independent
of all ideas and, therefore, as ouite separate from each other,
A so-called linkae-e, or spatial connection, or temporal relation
will be a new fact not logically involved in the definition of
either of these real beings. By hypothesis, neither, since
they were declared to be independently real, possesses any
character already Involving a tie with the other. The new real
?r. T^'BT
22 , 186 .
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being, the link is as much another being as the two beings were
originally different from each other. In addition, the link
will be a fact that is logically independent of both the orig-
inal beings. The realist* s ]l$any beings are defined as totally
disconnected and must remain so. They can never be linked by
space, time, or in any -physical relation.
As a logical conseq-uence of his definition, the realist,
according to Royce, can accord no common characteristics to
his Many beings. Let the realist s-unpose that two jnde-pendent
reals have a common q-uality and see if the conseqnonce is con-
sistent with his definition.
By hypothesis, no change whatever need occnr in one being
if the other is destroyed. This statement wonld also mean that
there would be no change of the s-nnposed common quality in the
undestroyed ob^ject. Royce employs the situation in which one
man survives a shi-pwreck while another drowns to show that the
destruction of one would necessarily effect a change in any
common quality existing in the two men.
The realist may modify his statement by saying that he
meant that the quality was partly identical and uartly not
identical. This modification is useless. Some part of the
part, some aspect of the aspect, no matter how small, must be
quite the same. That part cannot survive unchanged upon the
24
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The a-DT)«aranc9 callad "similarity" has no
real basis except when we are dealing with the
asnects or functions that may exist within what
our present arbitrary definition would call a
single real being. °
As the shafts of Royce^s vigorous dialectic destroy the
rationality of the realist* s decision for a world of the Many,
the realist may seek refuse only in a decision for the world of
One. A little reflection will show the impossibility of such a
refuge. Realism, it must be remembered, has already defined at
least two genuinely and absolutely independent real Beinsrs.
Ideas are facts of the mental world, as objects are in the uhy-
sical world. By the first hypothesis, since independence is a
nautual relation, the idea and its object are mutually a uair of
independent beings. Rovce calls the thesis that, ideas toe
(since reality means indeuendence ) , are existent entities, the
Forgotten Thesis of most realistic systems. A knowing process
and its object constitute the irreducible minimum of the real-
istic world. When idea and object are treated as a pair of mu-
tually independent entities, "the crisis of the realist*s des-
86
tiny is reached," the doom of his world at hand. Royce aerain
eonceives of an object and its idea and shows that there can
exist no possible relationship, only a nominal connection.
Therefore, Royce forces the realist into a dilemma, one from
which there isn't the slightest hope of deliverance. The real-
87
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Conaldarati on of its modi-figd f’ornas. With tho state
-
ment that no realist, when once confronted with the conseauences
of absolute independence of the Real will admit that he ever
meant total independence, Royce begins consideration of a mod-
28
ified realism. Can the realist modify the idea of total
independence and be consistent?
After the realist has said that he did not mean total in-
dependence, he will contend that the Real is not wholly indif-
ferent to whether anybody ioiows it or not, but is only relat-
ively, or practically, independent. Wow the realist says that
the Real is "such that, under conditions, it would become know-
able and known." 29 The essential relation of Reality to know-
ledge is a part of the real Being even before it is known. The
realist now says that knowledge occurs when things that possess
reality apart from knowledge come to influence the conscious
states of knowing Beings. Perception occurs when a real object
f,
makes an impression on a percipient. Furthermore, objects are
30
not wholly indifferent to the effects that they cause.
Royce merely mentions this view of relative independence
because the most thoroughgoing realists have not held it and
because such e compromise is an entire surrender of the realis-
tic thesis. He contends that the statement that the Real is not
wholly independent, only relatively so, has deeper conseauences
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could keep the convenient part of his doctrine and east aside
the logically inconvenient.
The criticism of the bases of modified realism first takes
the form of a ouestion: Can the Being of thiners be divided into
two carts
,
as the primary and the secondary oualities of matter
have been divided? Can part of a Being be wholly independent
of knowledge and the rest not independent of it? It is cren-
erally supposed that' this division is easily possible even if
not capable of being known in erreat detail,
Royce's former analysis of pure Realism provides him with
the means of slicing away the "independent" part of this now
divided universe. If the Re®l is wholly independent of know-
ledge, it would be contradictory. If any part of Reality is
completely independent, all of Royce*s former analysis would
apply to that part of the real universe.
"If no Reality can have entirely independent Being, no
31
part of reality can win such Being." Royce ends his con-
sideration of realism by saying that any statement of the real*s
being practically or partially independent of knowledge, does
not mean that it has two parts, one in essence independent of
whether it is knowi or not, the other essentially linked to
ideas. Modification of realistic epistemology is not enough; a
complete transformation is necessary to make it reasonable.
Royce finds that a modified Realism is subject to the same
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f
modified realism, the absolute independence of idea and object.
Therefore, the conclusions which now follow au-oly to unmodified
and modified realism alike. Any degree of independence involves
the same difficulties which weaken the view of absolute inde-
pendence.






i. Imrossibili ty of linkage o f independent reals by a j
third fact. If two reals are absolutely independent, so inde-
,
pendent that the disappearance of one would not in the least
|
effect the other, no third fact could later link these two reals 4
In case there were a third fact which raiarht later relate them,
this possibility of future relationship would have to be in-
j
Bluded in a present definition of the two reals and would there-
l)y destroy their independence. Then, a third fact would also be i
% new real which, by h3rpothesis, will be as much another beinc:
j
IS the two beings were originally diverse from each other.
hirtherraore, this link will be a fact logically independent of
32
;
)oth of the original beings.
j
ii. Impossibility of existence of common characteristics |
Ln independent reals . If one of two sppposed objects is de-
,
stroyed, by hypothesis of realism, the other will remain un- '
shanged in all its features and relations. The common quality
[
rill survive unchansred in all of its relations in the other. It
|
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object cannot be the same as what survives unchanged in the
other. It follows that the many entities of the realistic
33
world can have no features in common.
iii, Imnossibility of worlds of Many or One. If there is
no nossible linkage or no common feature in a realistic worlds
it auite easily follows that a world of the Many is imnossible.
Real beiners logically independent of one another are senarated
by absolutely iranass^ible chasms;
They can never come to ffet either ties or
community of nature; they are not in the same
space, nor in the same time^ nor in the same
natural or spiritual order .
The world of One is impossible because the irreducible minimum
of the realistic world is two independent b einers, idea and
35
object.
iv. Impossibility of any relation of realistic eni ste -
mological view to worl d. Realism has defined the idea as an
independent entity which has no true relation to its object.
It must be remembered that the realist's own theory is an idea
or opinion, the object of vdiich is the real world. The ffeneral
result, true of all ideas, opnlie s to the erroup of ideas called
the realistic theory. The realistic theory, by its own defin-
ition, has no necessarily true relation to the independent ex-
ternal world that its own account defines. ”The realm of con-
sistent Realism is not the realm of One nor yet the realm of
36
Many; it is the realm of absolutely Nothin?,"
131.
136-137.36.
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serve as a criterion for the Inds’enent of the value of criticism!
1
Royce's criticism ran^s hierh amonff such philosouhic al feats. One
|
of the reasons that this criticism has attracted so much atten-
tion is the fact thet it is so wide-reachiner. Royce has de-
Biemed it to include the main features of realism, thus to uer-
tain to all individual realists.
Some have characterized it as conclusive and deadly, the
rery destruction of realism: others have counted it irrelevant
ind insignificant. Perhaps it is not strange that the favorable
istimates have tended to come from idealists or parsons with
Idealistic sympathies and the unfavorable estimates from real-
.sts or nersons with anti -ideal i Stic symnathies. An examination
)f the various ma.ior estimates of the criticism will provide a
)ack:-e:round for an impartial .iuderment. In s-eneral, the estimates
^all into the cate«?ories o f unfavorable and favorable.
1. UNFAVORABLE ESTIIvIATES
i. Estimate of Perry. Ralph Barton Perry raises vary ser-
,ous ob lections to Royce’s criticism of realism. As Perry
Joints out, the most important steu in Roycp's dial^^ctlc is the
•eduction of the relation of idea and ob lect to absolute mutual
aloofness as the necessary meaning' o-f* the realist's idea of
"
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lndeT)0ndence . If this is what the realist means hy indenend-
ence, Royce's criticism is deadly. His loeic is otherwise
im-nre^rnable and leads the realist into a dilemna. If Perry
can prove that the realist does no t necessari ly mean mntnal
aloofness and if he can consistently hold another view of
independence, he does a great deal to weaken the effectiveness
of Royce*s dialectic. Therefore, Perry advances the thesis
that it is possible’ to state the realistic hypothesis in such
a way as to involve the relation of an idea to its object
wi thont "vitiating 1he independence of the object; or, so as
to specify that the object shall be independent of its idea"
withont making the implication of a similar independence on
g
the part of the idea.
(1) Royce*s definition of realism . In the first place,
Royee is gnilty of a serions ambigpity arising from his failnre
to specify the nse of the term knowledge. Royee asserts in one
Place that:
independence of yonr knowing processes, and of
all spch knowing, as is yonr seeing, i.e., of
all actnal or possible external knowing processes
whatever, is not only a nni versa! character of
real objects, bnt also c onstitntes the very de-
finition of the reality of the known object, so
that to be, i s to be such that an external
knov^er's knowledge, whetler it occprs or not, can
make no difference, as mere knowledge, to the
inner reality of the known object.
1. Perry, Art. IT902), 452.
2. Ibid, 452.
3. Royee, WI, I, 66.
I











0 A i -r
^












Royce first seems to imply that reality i s indeioendent of any
form of conscionsness. He accents Locke’s acconnt of primary
qualities as tynical of the realist’s definition. Perry
states that this definition represents neither common sense
or any historical type of philosophy. He states that even
materialism, which approaches this definition most closely,
has always selected as the essence of reality some definite
substance (water if'Thales, ether of monists, spatial predi-
cates of Descartes. ) Perry contends that even materialism is
4
positive ontology and not a negative epistemology. Later
Royce gives realism a more liberal definition. He then makes
realism to mean that it is of the essence of reality to he
independent of such representative ideas as maybe referred to
it. Still, however. Perry considers that Royce has not formed
a truly representative definition and he himself forms one
which he considers more fair to the realist. The realist
believes reality "to be a datum, a somewhat that is given in-
4
dependently of whatever ideas maybe formed about it.” Here
the real is regardless of whatever secondary meanings, symbols,
names, relations, or ideas of any kind which may be referred
to it. The realist conceives of a thing and thought about
a thing. There are two orders, but not necessarily two kinds.
The first order is Indifferent to the second, though they may
be related.
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^2) Royce ^s i dea of independence
.
When the realist
says that reality is inde-pendent of ideas about it, Royce
contends that mutual independence is the logical outcome.
Realism defines the real object "o" so as to be indeuendent of
the idea of "o". If the idea of "o" vanishes or varies, there
is no relation between the two which w/ould comuel a corres-
ponding chane:e in ”o”. But the idea of "o" is itself a real
object and, "uuon the realistic basis must therefore be sim-
ilarly independent” of -- what? Royce fallaciously says of
”o”. Perry contends that the idea of ” o" as a psychological
entity, is independent, not of "o”, but of another idea, the
5
idea of idea o^ ”o” Thus the independence is not reciprocal.
Royce in another connection says that independence must
be mutual and absolute because otherwise one could prove
something about the existence of the object by merely exam-
ining the idea. The contention is that, if the idea were
in every case in some way related to an object, the presence
of the idea would be a sure indication of the reality of the
object; therefore, the being of the object would be logically
dependent upon 1he existence of its idea and wotild contradict
the realistic hypothesis. Perry admits that the idea has a
certain objective reference and may Point to the reality in
general or to a specific locus, but these facts need not force
the realist to abandon his original position. The reality has
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omitted from the universe, only the deduction of ”o" is im-
paired since the idea of ”o” was originally derived from "o"
and not the reverse. If the idea of ”o” varies or disanpears
in time, ” 0" does not necessarily change for ” 0” need not he
sensitive to its idea more than a body to its shadow.
On the other hand, ” 0" may change without concomitant
variations in the idea of ” 0"; or the idea of ” 0 ” may not have
been an accurate ide'a from the beelnninff. There will, however,
be a case of erroneous ideas. Perry states that if ‘’o'* is
omitted from the universe, that the idea will be destroyed be-
cause the idea would never have auioeared had there not been a
particular "o'i If
''
0 " disapue ars in time or is omitted from the
universe the idea will disappear since when ”you destroy the
idea, you destroy the self, frcra vhiehV'was defined as a
6
direction.” Perry says that "this is so because one direction
cannot be lost without a loss of all direction. Perry is not
at all clear at this point, but he seems to be maicing an erron-
eous statement, that an idea cannot survive after its referent
has been destroyed. Surely he cannot mean that all ideas of
relatives are destroyed because the relatives have died.
Regardless of this error. Perry here shows that the
relation between idea and object is not one of mutual in-
dependence •
Royce aunlies his idea of independence to the theory
6. Perry, Art. (1902) 452.
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of the world. Royce contends that, since the realistic
theory is a erronp of ideas which are independent of their
oh.lect, the realistic theory is as regardless of the real
world as the real world is of it. Perry, however, states
that it is nerfectly nossihle for the realist to hold that
his nhilosophy, thouerh as content of his conscious life
independent of what ideas o tiers may form about it, is never-
theless, as ideas, e’ntirely derived from "the actual world of
exTBrience. This conclusion of Royce is invalid because it
depends on absolute and mutual independence, a conceution which
7
the realist does not accept.
(3) Realism and pluralism . If realism means absolute
independence of even idea and object, it necessarily follows
that realism is pluralism. Perry does not assent to Royce *s
reduction of realism to abstract pluralism, but nevertheless
examines the argument.
Perry enters a "general demurrer" into Royce *s method
of conducting this ohase of his case by pointing out that
Royce takes for granted that the burden o f uroof lies with the
pluralist and that he den&nds the pluralist to prove the ex-
istence o f many separate beings. This demand Perry counts
absurd because the pluralist is concerned neither with ab-
8
s tract separateness nor with proof. Sven in the midst of
his criticism, Royce assumes the re cessity of transcendental
unity. Perry states that the burden of uroof lies with the
T;—TblU, 4^.
8. Ibid, 454.
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transcendentalist. The pluralist simply finds the world to
he many. He encounters other selves, many of whom are
different from him. Such selves are not absolutely seuarate;
j
on the contrary, their community is the very source of their
j
mutual discovery. The pluralist alleges that there is in the i
world simply the amount of unity and difference that there
j
seems to be. This "e’eneral demurrer” has the two-fold imuort-
9
ance according to Perry.
In the first place, it makes clear tie futility of setting:
up for controversial purposes an absolute Pluralism, which
none but a transcendentalist could ever have conceived and
10
which, when destroyed, injures most of all Royce's method.
In the second ulace, this general objection destroys the force
of Royee*s arguments, three of Mdiich Perry considers.
First, Royce has already precluded the impossibility of
absolutely independent beings. The pluralist finds physical
objects which, so far as he knows, do not influence one another.
He simply recognizes in his world objects which are independent
in such a way that a change of one would not affect the other.
i
Perry denies that theoretical possibility of interaction is
itself a bond of union. The pluralist can conceive of some
things which have eternal separateness. The burden of proof
11
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V
This statement, however, does not conclude the matter. Onaht
one accept the actuality of all oh^iects the existence of
which can he conceived and cannot be disproved? The burden
of proof does lie on the realist as it does on anyone who
claims the existence of anything that is self-evident.
Second, Royce states that many independent beings can
never acquire any possible real linxage or connection and
must be' forever sundered. Perry contends that the pluralist
is not in any way subject to alteration by another. On the
other hand, the pluralist does not necessarily care that the
absolutely independent objects, if there be such, should ever
become dependent. Royce* s conclusion would follow only in
case it is assumed that all relations involve deuendence, an
12
assurantion which is neither nioved nor self-evident.
Third, Royce* s statement of the impossibility of common
characteristics in two real beings depends on the assumption
that similarity involves identity. Similarity is, however,
commonly regarded as dependent uuon the judgment of a synthetic
consciousness. Perry is quick: to deny that this consciousness
is Royce* s Absolute. The uluralist holds that it is uerfectly
legitimate to define sameness in terms of possible exuerience.
Perry supposes that a and b are alike in Q, when compared by
consciousness M. ViThoever exueriences a, exueriences Q; who-
ever experiences b experiences Q. The sameness of Q and Q
consist in the situation that a and b are cornTjared. The
sameness exists not merely in the possibility of exuerience,
4M.—IbIT
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"btit exists in the experienced content of a and b severally.
In Q there is a new fact of observed sameness when a and b
are compared, M comes to see the resemblance between a and b
and a new fact appears in the universe. This fact was pre-
viously contained potentially in separate elements bronght
13
together,
(4) Perry* 8 theory of independence . Some years after
the refutation thus- far considered, Perry formulated a theory
of independence vdiich directly and indirectly refutes Royce*s
criticism. It does so directly in that it points explicitly
to weaknesses of Royce*s criticisn. It does so Indirectly in
that it attempts to formulate a conception of independence
which exempts realism from Royce*s dialectic. As has been
previously stated, the most important sten in Royee's dialectic
is the reduction of the idea of independence to absolute mutu-
al aloofness. Here Perry attempts to show that independence
does not imply absence of relation or absolute mutual aloof-
ness. If he can do this there is little doubt that he strikes
a heavy blow at Royee's criticism. It seems that Perry's at-
tempt at defining clearly the idea of independence so as to
prove Royee's definition incorrect is actually a more effect-
ive refutation than his previous treatment.
Perry reali^^es that realists have not as yet taken the
pains to define independence and he contends that realists
must purify the notion of all suggestions of "otherness, re-
14
noteness, or inaccessibility", Royce, explicitly identifying
13,
“' Ibid,7 457.
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reali sra with the independence theory, merely characterizes an i
independent entity as that to which another entity "makes no
16
difference." This definition. Perry says. Introduces "prac-
tical or dynamical considerations which are more confnsinfi'
16
than clarifying,
Per the sake of brevity in e-jpoosition of Perry* s view it
seems wise to state briefly his main conclusions followed by
enon^srh detail to explain his reasoninff.
(i) Independence is non-dependence. The word independencr
is simply the denial of dependence and shonld not connote sec-
ondary meanine:s of a positive natinre. Perry analyzes the list
of variops senses in which the terra dependence may be psed.
His list of meanings of dependence, which he admits is neither
final nor complete, yields five possibilities: relation,
whole-part, exclpsive capsation, implying, being exclpsively
17
implied.
(ii) Dependence is not the same as relation, bpt is a
special type of relationship, in which the dependent contains,
implies, or is exclpsively capsed or implied by that on which
18
it is dependent,
(iii) The independent may be related or not, provided
that it is not related as in ( ii )
.
Independence, moreover,
is not non-relation even thopgh the realist does not deny the
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one which leaves each factor trecisely what it was, viz.,
ahsolntely in itself and independent. If the real were
necessarily ont of relation to knowledsre, then it is obvious
that, as real, things could not be in relation of beinff known
A relation of dependence would reauire that "a*'contains’'b"; or
l' 1/ V' /I
that a is the cause or effect of b in a system which exclusive-
II
ly determines a; or that a implies b; or that a is implied
exclusively by b. Any other relation of a and b would be be-
19
side the point.
Perry considers this a suitable point to eliminate three
current misconceutl ons all of which he attributes to Royce,
In the first place, the realist does not propose to define real
ty in terms of its independence, because doing so would be a
clumsy contradiction. If a' is independent of "b,' then "a "must be
definable, if at all, in other terms than*'bV Indeuendence
after all is not a relation, but only the absence of a certain
20
type of relation.
In the second place, realism does not assert that every-
\i II ><<>>' /*
thing which is true of a is independent of b. a's independence
»\ il 1
1
of b is true of a; and this judgment depends on b. The inde-
• i n /i
pendence of a as resuects b means that the b-things, which may
^
„21
or may not be true, are not necessary to a.
In the third place, realism does not deny that, when a
enters into a relation, such as knowledge, of which it is
i‘ It
independent, a acquires that relation, and is accordingly
19. Ibid., 1171118.
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different “by so much . What realism denies is that this added
relation is necessary to a as already constituted. When'a'is
known, 'a' as made up without knowledge, is independent of that
i' «
circumstance. The new comnlex known- a is dependent on know-
82
ledge as one of its narts.
( iv) General terms of theory of independence. Perry
points out that all simple entities are independent of another
entity or of complexes of which they are members. Simple en-
tities cannot be dependent in the whole-uart sense because,
being simple, they cannot be vdioles composed of parts. They
cannot be causally related because they cannot be values of
23
variables, since such would belie their simplicity.
Again complexes are mutually independent as respects their
simple constituents. Therefore, tw) complexes with some con-
stituents in common are not made interdependent by the fact.
Perry points out that Royce^s argument against the existence of
common qualities in *^many entities of the realistic world" is
based upon the false assumption that, when an entity is de-
stroyed, its Dualities are likewise destroyed, or that the
simple constituents of a complex are dependent on the complex.
Perry states that a first complex is dependent on a sec-
ond complex when the second complex is a part of the first.
This relation, simply a restatanent of the whole-part type of
dependence, points out that dependence is not reciprocal. A
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ty virtue of its participation therein, hut only in so far as
it stands in relations of dependence with the other narts. The
members of a collection are not dependent on the collection,




members of the collection.
|
A first complex is dependent on a second when the first is
either the cause or effect of the .second within a system
which exclusively determines the first. Dependence by causa-
tion is reciprocal; however, where this relation is complicated
wi th the whole-part relation, the resulting deuendence is not
24
necessarily recinrocal.
A first complex is deuendent on a second complex when the
first implies the second. In liice manner, the major ursmise
of a sylloerism does not depend on the conclusion, for the sin-
gle uipmise does not imply. The falsity of the conclusion does
not prove the falsity of the major premise, but only the com-
bination of premises. That which implies, it must be remembered
is what is dependent and not its c cmnonents taxen severally.
A first complex is deuendent on a second comulex when the
first is implied by the second, and is not otherwise iraulied.
If a conclusion is inferred from several pairs of uremises, it
cannot be designated as deuendent on any one pair. If a certain
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After Perry denotes these cases of dependence, he states
that a first complex is independent of a second complex when-
ever the first is not dependent on tie second in any sense
which he has enumerated. He points out that entities are in-
dependent unless they are proved to he dependent. It is im-
possible to reduce relation to dependence. "If hare relations
25
he a miracle, then dependence is a compound miracle,"
Perry concludes’ his General theory with the statement
tliat a first entity may acquire dependence on a second entity.
He warns that this statemen t mu st he sruarded and is true only
in a very limited sense. He aprain points out; that dependence
of complexes does not involve the dependence of their simple
components- Nevertheless, a complex may hecome dependent on a
second of which it was formerly independent. A body, for in-
stance, may move into a new field of force and so acouire a
new causal dependence. Provided it he admitted that the body
in question has changed, this constitutes an example of ac-
cuired dependence. Perry denies that an entity can acouire
dependence when all that ever happens, or may possibly happen,
to it is included in the definition of the entity. Vervv fur-
ther accuses Royce of this very fallacy, Royce makes possi-
bility already a part of bein^ Perry contends that even if
some entity does in the future cross the path of another in
such a way so as to brinff about dependence, the point of the
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own life history, qtiite regardless of the earlier days of the
the other. PrrtherTnore
,
Perry states that the failure to de-
fine anything short of all that does or may hapnen to it, de-
nies the -Dossihility of change from inderendence to derendence,
86
in fact, change of any kind.
(v) The oh,1ect of consciousness is related to con-
sciousness, hut it does not follow that it is denendent on
consciousness. Peri‘y contends that, when an entity is known
or otherwise experienced, it is related to c onsciousness
.
f
This contention further implies that simple entities are not
denendent on consciousness. The knowledge of such entities
is involved in the method of analysis. Tf one is to recog-
nize a complex as such, he must he able to discover its slmnle
comnonents since a comniex denends on such simple components
for nature and n^anin^. Yet a simple entity must he known
together with some context or schematism, with some other
knowledge at the same time, if it is to he known at all.
Coranlexes, as well, are indenendent of knowledge as re-
snects their simnle constituents. Whatever conclusion may he
reached as to the indenendence of some comnlexes on knowledge,
it is important to observe that this can in no way e
87
the independence of the terms into which they can he analyzed.
( vi
)
There are entities, embracing all simnle s and some
complexes, which are not dependent on consciousness, because
they are not related in the snecial way already defined as
* 2B'.
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const! tilting dependence. The propositions of logic and math-
ematics are independent of consei onsness . In these proposit-
ions there is no relation to a backgrophd of feel ins'
^
or to
an appercei vins? mass, or to the activity of a self or respond-
ing organism. Even if the propositions are implied by know-
ledsre and do sustain capsal relations v;i th the spb.ject of
icnowledsre
,
they are not thus exclnsively implied. they
are not necessary for cognitive reasons, they are still necess-
ary for logical and mathematical ones.
Physical complexes are independent of consci onsness.
Perry points to the mean velocity of the planet Jppiter for
illustration. It neither contains nor implies the cognitive
relation. Even assuming that this complex is implied by the
knowledge of it and that it holds causal relations with the
subject of knowledfi'e, it is non-the less independent because
of the fact that it may be determined completely by other re-
lations. It can be deduced from the celestial gravitational
28
system without reference to cognition.
(vii) Absence of dependence does not prevent simples and
some complexes from being otherwise related to consciousness.
Perry attempts to observe the knowledge process in the concrete
and to take into account whatever physiological, psychological
,
r ethical factors it appears to involve. The result is that
he knowledge process has laws of its own and the parts of the
owledge process, including the object, must submit to the
tS. Ibid., 189-132.
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conditions which knowledge imposes.
Perry assnmes that consciousness is a
nrocess containing a nervously endowed oreanisra,
a sueciflc tyre of resuonse to stimulation, and 29
uortions of an environment selected by the response.
Moreover, he holds that the process is interested or teleol-
gical. The consciousness of an object demands that it obey
the laws of optics or acoustics, the biological and ethical
laws which govern the action of an organism on its environment.
The object is so far detemined by the subject of consciousness
and is therefore deducible from all these factors. This does
not, however, preclude the object’s indeuendence of conscious-
ness. In so far as any object is deducible otherwise than from
consciousness, it is indeuendent of consciousness. A thing may
become known and cease to be known even though knowledge in-
30
volve a modicum of independence.
(viii) There are cases of subjectivity, that is, of com-
plexes that as such are dependent on c onsciousness. Quite nat-
urally uarts of consciousness are dependent on the Dihole of
consciousness. An object -of-consciousness cannot be such
without consciousness. This relationship is simuly one of a
whole on its parts. Parts of consciousness are reciurocally
dependent within the system o f consciousness, but only in a
limited sense. A thing is a part of consciousness because of
the action of other parts, and as such its behavior is conform-
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elements alone in one complex is denendent on the selective
action of consciousness. Moreover, this nresence of some
elements together in one coranlex is denendent on the com-
31
bining action of consci oneness . Values, v'orks of arts,
the hierher comnlexes, such as history, society, life, or re-
flective thonffht are denendent on consciousness,
(ix) Subjective comnlexes both contain entities that
are independent of them and also indenendent of secondary
conscious rel ationships into which they may enter. The
subject. Perry contends, is independent of beine: known. Thus
there may be consciousness ^^ithout self-consciousness. A con-
sciousness is indenendent of another in so far as it does not
include or imnly it, or sustain relations of exclusive determ-
ination with it. Mental content is independent of introspect-
ion. Any doubt as to the truth of this assertion must cast
suspicion on the validity of the method introspection. Intro-
snection yields prenuine pfeycholoffical results only in so far
as it reveals that which was determined to be in mind apart
from the act of introspection itself. Value also is indeuenden
of judgments about value, Percertion and Simula apurehension
are indenendent of reflective thous-ht. Things have an inde-
pendent footing in an immediate or uresentative knowledge which
not only exceeds but also underlies mediate or reuresentative
knowlede^e
,
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ii. Estimate of Drisco ll, John T. Driscoll, a Scholastic I
philosopher , states that the classification of the four con-
ceptions of Being, one of which is that of realism, is vaene
and unsatisfactory when viewed as a classification and erron-
j
eous when studied in detail. Driscoll noints out that Royce
confesses that he refers to an ertrerae form of realism, and
thereby reveals that his criticism is not "broad, nor scholarly,
nor exact." Driscoll contends that Royce fails to distinguish
betv^een the human and divine mind when he re.lects realism as
a theory which proclaims Being and Reality to be independent
of mind. Driscoll maintains that the fact that the world has
Being and Reality indenendent of our mind is a fact, which
"no elaborate system of Philosophy can destroy." Driscoll's
final statement concerning the matter is that no one, unless
he i s an atheist or a materialist, admits that 1he world is
32
indenendent of the divine mind.
This explanation of Driscoll still does not raaxe an escane
for realism from Royce 's dialectic. According to Royce 's con-
clusion, anything indenendent of mind cannot be known by mind.
Driscoll's explanation makes possible knowledge of the world
for God, but still leaves the world unknowable for human minds
which is naturally the primary concern,
iii. Estimate of Rogers. Tt seems to Arthur K. Rogers
that Royce' s refutation turns out to have certain peculiarities
which limit its effectiveness. Royce's very beeinning, his
32. Driscoll, PPE, 61
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definition of realism* s concenli on of reality as the total I
absence of relations, solicits objections from the realist.
|
The realist, when he says that the object exists independently
[
of its being known, does not mean 1hat snch independence con-
,
stitp.tes its existence. The object’s existence is what it may
|
happen to be; its existential independence is only one conse-
I
qnence of this. Rogers contends that the entire cogency of
Royce’s dialectic depends upon "thus loading the dice against
independence by his preliminary definiUon." If it is admitted
that reality is definable as itself nothing but a total absence
of relation, the deathly consequences are readily evident. If,
however, it is supposed that the object is somethiner other
than its relation of independence, it seems reasonable that the
object might well have this relation as well as other relations
without ceasing to be existential ly/Dther than an experience
which knows it. Of course, this statement assumes 1hat the powa*
of relations to be real outside a unitary mind will not be ex-
cluded. Sven if relations cannot be real outside a unitary min^
the assumption cannot be made in an argument intended to demon-
strate it. Rogers states that whan "realism talks of an object
as wholly other than ideas, it does not need to mean that ideal i
characters are to be excluded from the description of 1he object?
’(That it does mean is that the object embodies the ideal char-
acters in a fo ira of existence which is not identical with tiieir
existence as thoughts in the individual mind. Rogers attributes
all the dialectical difficulties to the determination, "already
,
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familiar in the idealist," to absorb existence into logic.
Rogers has missed the strength of Eoyce's argument. Even I
though Royce at times seems to make the object *8 quality of
independence its reality, his logic assumes more. What is real
for the realist, according to Royce, is what is independent of
knowledge, not the mere abstraction, independence. Roarers has
done little to prove Royce *s criticism ineffective.
iv. Estimate of Prat t. James B. Pratt says that Ihe
only necessary reply to Royce ^s criticism is to remind the
reader that independence does not mean lack of relatedness.
He further states that unless all existence i s to be reduced
to an "amorphous jumble," unless the hope of having anything
to deal with, the possibility of one thing being related to
another and yet not dependent on that other must be at least
entertained. Two objects may be related in a dozen ways and
yet continue to exist and be related in eleven ways upon the
destruction of one of the relations. The realist agrees that
when anything is the object of knowledge or of thought, it is
related to it. It is related to thought "noetically, " tempor-
ally, and, in many cases, causally. There is, however, no
reason why the thing in cuestion might not cease to be noetic-
ally related to any existent self or psychosis, and still not
only continue to exist, but also to be related to various
"cognitive centers" in various other ways. Pratt concludes
33. Rogers, EAP, P91-?92.
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that Royee’s argument has really dania«?ed realism very little.
V. Estimate of Peirce. Perhars the most vitriolic re-
sponse to Royce's criticism is that of C. S. Peirce. He claims
that Royce is blind to the fact that ail "ordinary" people see
plainly enon^h; that is, that the essence of the realist's
position is that it is one thins: to be and another to be
represented. Peirce attributes the cause of thi s blindness
to the fact that Royce is completely immersed in his absolute
idealism which necessarily denies that distinction. Peirce
states that Royce is in his element and that In his arsrument
there is total reflection at its surface. Professor Royce
asKS the realist to admit as a prauise that object and its
representation are independent in such a way that relation is
impossible. The conclusion which Royce deduces is that if B
is linked as cause to any determination of R, there must be a
tertium quid bv the mediation of which the causation takes
place. Peirce declares the premise absurd. He does not attack
the logicality, the premises belne: false. Royce, armed with
his wronR definition of realism, ^oes on to a dilemna to prove
that, whether the realist says that thine-s are one or many, he
equally involves himself in contradiction. Peirce points out
to this "powerful and accurate thinker who has been so com-
pletely led astray in his argumentation by Heerelian logic" that
absolute idealism depends on assuming that portion at the out-
set. Peirce, therefore, states that, if Royce is addressing' hi s
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arffiiTTient to students who were all ready ahsoliite idealists, he
will not nndertaice to say whether it is serviceable for the
develonmant of the doctrine or not. He contends that, if the
I
areniment is to be convincing to realists, that it must conform
to lo^cal nrincinles reco^niz-ed by realists. Peirce says that
Royce knows well that realists do not admit that matter of fact
can be demonstrated by clear nroof. He states further that, if
realists are driven in a corner, they will simnly modify their
admission so far as maybe necessary to avoid self contradiction,
Peirce contends that it is imnossible to close such an escana in
areuinR’ about matter of fact. Since realism is a matter of
hard fact, Peirce contends that Royce *s method must be revo-
35
lutionized if he is to convince any master of loe’ic.
Peirce* s criticism is not based on losric, but simply
on emotional antogonism,
vi, Estimate of Montague . Royce states that, according
to realism, to be real means to be indenendent of an idea or
exuerience throufrh which the real beini? is, from without, felt,
thouerht, or known. He states f»irther that the view, recoffniz-
inc: indenendent beiners as real, lays exolici t stress unon their
36
indeuendence as the verv essence of their reality. Montague
says that the indeuendence is not v>hat makes an ob.iect real,
but is what makes the individual aware that it is real. The
^
indeuendence of an ohiect in the face of numerous variations
in its idea is an effect o f 1 ts reality, and not the cause of it,
35 , Peirce, Art. (1908) 94-96*
36, Royce, WI, I, 68.
50
Wt
. . H . 'I
: W ' ,
•ir-
,J V I




r^'f r ToV fitooi '-'ta tii rf -t. s i>ca:r ^6n Li tw
rjt I ? I^ 0 fcri:,i'T r I" o r . oij * o<s3h tr*" lo, t f« « c
. : m r.”*! n vi
-ai- • Ot ! * -
^fir.€« <' ViOiTiTH'. :? < f **t r? f
>! 0 *: f Ivr/'T't




i Hr* -tp ^ i-rc b ^jr'‘r*'r.cr '.b '•'Cf mo
«
^
'fcga. , 'i': ' ft: a5C'*'‘*r^ Tr ifai^cet




' OLL'D Oi^ t tfilFfiOftCti SX f .briferf^OO a*)i
1 o 7rJ‘:r.‘'fr * m r. f J Cp-^" porti^: .
'
'J'O •tfil“^?r %fltV!3*rB T‘
- TfT dff d'r M.v fi,r vr ’ viv -,h' fr-i.t r- ^‘^d'roo 'o-riryi I
^
- kSt V •
^
C ' F'Otffvncn c* ^ '. ^i >.«:> ino ii? Jl l
-* ;
' ro ^f.e«<f ‘'’'t ‘-'i nei f fiio *^'ei>'tXe“ ,























iV f. t" • : ajtCqrt Bv.ifi
,






I r. iiwrr t-
. ^ t i-f. fi': Yt. •'j! / ^'-’.H^^. '^''r • V • •f;f i* J.'; f ' fft Tf'filji'
/
. ^
jfr ;< ; p •*,'’ «i - ni.tjfji'tp' 'oc^ ar(.t ^
< Ij
;








































Montaerne considers that this fallacy is the eanse of many of
37
the dire results su-o-nosed to hefall the realist.
The first imrilication of the independence theory of
realism, states Royce, is what Montaerue has called erternality
of relations. Montague answers this arirument hy first telline-
^"'hat kind of independence it is that the realist means. In-
dependence is the independence that, followlns- from numerical
separateness, is a eie-n that separateness exists. Any rela-
tion consistent with numerical separateness will he consistent
with whaterer independence is implied hy that separateness.
Montaerue states that, because two thinsrs are separate does not
mean that they cannot cause chaneres in one another. Realism
does not assert an independence that is so ahso!!ute as to
38
make all relations ‘external* or non-existent. Here
Montasrue is not defining realism, hut simply dualism, which
may helonff either to realism or idealism.
Royce considers that the second implication of realism is
that the independence must he absolute. The whole heinff of
the oh,iect is independent for all times and under all con-
ceivable circumstances. Montaerue states that pointing to any
two oh;iects conceived of hy the realist as independent will
refute this implication. He says that a mine and a fuse have
all the independence demanded hy the realist of his idea and
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The third iTn-nlication w^ich Ror/ce assigns to the inderend-
ence theory is ra-utual inderendence of idea and oh.iect. Montafri^e
admits that two considerations seem to bear ont this conclusion;!
(?.) numerical separateness is a reciprocal relation; (b) the 1
independence enjoyed by each meTrber can be overcome only by the
medium of a self. He states, however, that here the reciprocity
ends. Montague points out that the manner in which the self*s
ideas influence their objects, and the deerree of that influence,
is different from the manner and decree of the object's influenc«
upon their ideas. Montaenie cites as evidence of this non-mut-
uality the case of an idea or belief eyistins* in a mind which
from blindness or inability refuses to put its judgments to an
40
objective test.
In suunort of this third implication Royce states that, if
mutrial indeuendence is not meant, mere examination of the idea
taken by itseif wpuld prove something about the existence of
its object. Montapiie confesses that he must have misunderstood
this phase of the argument. To him Royce seems to be statins
some thins which is utterly absurd. Royce seems to say that the
inferring of the existence of a cause from the uerceution of its
effect is makins the existence of a 1hins follow from the ures-
8nce of its mere idea, to say that "your uerceution of Smith's
liat is the cause of Smith's existence." Reference to Perry's
Interuretati on of this implication bear^ Montasue out in the fear
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W'iTt Mont’ie'ae turns to Royce*s Pttenrnt at discover! ne’
whether the realistic world is Many or One. Royce contends
that the realist cannot cite examples of entities which conld
exist in the same world of time and snace withont heinsr mn-
tnally dependent in a sense barred ont by the realistic theory.
Thus the realist mnst loolc into the snpe rsensnons for many in-
deoendent beiners. Montaeme states that the coerency of this
ar^roment has been destroyed by his criticism of the second im-
plication of the independence theory already mentioned. Montaerpd
states that Royce *s entire refutation is based on his theory
that there can be no independence in a realist's world except
41
hyper-independence, a self-contradic tory notion.
Royce 's statement that the real be ins’s of the realist's
World can have no common characters is based on the false as-
sumption that oipalities maybe destroyed. Then, too, Royce
confuses qualitative similarity or dissimilarity with numer-
ical identity or non-identity. Thus Montague considers that
he has shown that Royce 's criticism lacks finality.
53
3, PAV^RARTl? ^STT?.!ATT?S
Quite nattura-llv the favorable estimates have not been as
lensrthy as the unfavorable ones. In the ma.iority of instances
there has been simple affirmation without any detail as to
rarious reasons why the criticism seems valid.
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treatment of realism to "be a "conclusive damnatory critiotie.*''
j
Bowiaon counts the grreat virtue of the crttioue to he its vindi-
cation of "Systematic Truth as the only valid director of feel-
1
iner and conduct." The critioue shows that nothing stands alone
and isolated in the universe uresent to thinking. It shows that
j
sach truth rests on others and on all. Howison states tha t the
|
criticism has:
logically annulled Realism hy reducing it to the
unayoidahle and ruinous shuttllner from materialism to
agnosticism, from agnosticism to materialism, ever back
and forth, and forced the thinking holder of it out of
its lines into the wide onen field of Mysticism, to he
driven thencftpaffain into the clutches of Critical
Rationalism.
1
ii. Estimate of Cunningham, Althouerh S. Watts Cunnine-ham
ioes not asrree with Royce's solution of the urohlem of external
4nd internal meaning in the knowledge process, he considers that
Joyce has been conclusive in showing that realism does not offer
\ satisfactory solution. There seem to he three possible ways
cut of the paradox of the duality of meaning: either to deny
the duality outright and retain only one asuect as all there is
cf meaning; or, accenting the duality as inescanahle, to consider
either the external or the internal logically fundamental.
Realism makes meanine' entirely external. this is the
iituation, meanings are not in an intelligible sense the indi-
ridual's. They are totally beyond him. Mind cannot be posited
is relation, A meaning may not be erroneous simnly by entering
Into a relation of which it is by definition utterly indeuendent.
[f meanings are to be twisted by a relation, they must be
4S. Howison, Art, (1916), 4.
"
- r o 0 viH.^inifot) J9 yj oJ ftrt I
,1 • . . f> i
-
•-' fv : j f-i' f cir fi i. tyfj ^c? f‘'-->'Yjt/ ^ er'^ tro/*, iwoK;
'
’io i>/xiOfV il) M l*tV ^nf> ~ t r'M' oUjwrc ft <r ’ ‘'“r coi^£ 6 ,




» eiiiC'i?- ^u'xts “Moiif^fon .tnrf'+ g-ivoar^ \.‘^iti*ro Cf7' ''. > .~oc i)ntf ^ni
r o f r^.-'ttvta'f '.KJ rl Tor i bnif
. ?
I
4-rf.t t ?:iJ’ ^i,;/?t<=; roBi^'O
.
.Cf'- r;'.* orn i-'r^rifo no ri^foT- roi't<'
t
^
::r ..i A.e. ' o i-
C- J*
^
c .i f>!.'he '2 D^HiL 'cf: -Of xlirniir*. vilXeoi.riOi.
' if T f L»i ! ’r•..,^ 3 :’^' r>''r> /^vCi ;/«? -f.fe wor;f»r'; rs p
,j




'IfbCOil ^ f^iir fii.^ //«T8
i & : c.i , 'T» !>(,>• *. D^Cc-x^ i^aqro tihlT* ^u'i. offif s*t
J
loo 'J'rvO "to P‘- ' , itf o^fjat ; ' PO'^' tTi>
\
' , rn <
I
([
f npirr ptt rft.t/ ni' 7^ V. ^ .-‘i















t.'T^o crc'O riffvjo RiRlijcr';? I ^-nivorift l i -• i e ilon-v?» r epcf ct»jf «o'rv:'.i
8 :p'W f£<fie«o<T Eeti i of p'f'-ri'j , 3oi.tfrIe^ 'f ©Klai^f-io ci
1 .
v'^f ’j i.*- TfrfJ'if r^P’iUP^'.- » f/Kf’’-) t :*; ‘*-.i'.f.q ^if'f t'- t po-
rt i‘ tie jt'c.g.'in e: ‘ - ^‘-g « cJ’ir.'iO'is apt
fdicaoi>f.f /''IcfX^nfrj-.prr! <:>r •.J'iioi/ft orft *afJ‘^r*-r'
. V* ‘nfctpxjjflsrr v; i. ilHOi*^oX raoTcEu^. ,.jr 'm
>
eJ 3 fH- "M , n|j:o .’lenjla
_-.' Ir/ PT «* , -m' '.:»
; |
-jijf.i •a d’ fcfiiTP^ aldi?* 1 r
'
5*1 rf r .r^.f t rr ''•*».* r
' i
,
Df^Sfjeoq t<f ifoi .iffo Lr!*/. ,v }i dr v ' rarM
I














( 1^' I ?f ) . ' I
,
PO 3 iP»r '
•.^'I 'f.
em'bedded in it. Royce has shown in his analysis of realism that
the dnalitv of meaning will have to he admitted in order to es-
care from a self-refu tins’ oh ,1ec tivi am.
iii.' ''ilstimate of Brightman . "3. S. Brierhtman considers
that the conclusion of neo-realism statinj^ that ttniversals
have no "home" is not vali d hecause of the effectiveness of
Royce *s criticism. If rniversals have no "home", then no
universal is essentially related to any other universals or
to any particulars, for any si7ch relation would furnish a
"home". Yet this cannot stand because, Brishtraan says, "f^oyce
has disposed once for all of the independent reals,* so well
44
that no realist will errant Royce meant him."
3. EVAITTATION OF TFS CRITICISM
The task now at hand is a final evaluation of Royce 's
criticism in the lieht of these many opinions concerning it.
Are all of the objections valid ones? What can he said about
the real value of the criticism?
i. Mutual independence . As has been rreviously stated,
the most important ster in Royce 's dialectic is his statement
that the inderendence theory of realism necessarily imulies ab-
solute mutual indenendence betv/een idea and object. This con-
clusion he draws vdth ihe support of two arguments. (1) The
idea, as a psychological entity, is also an object and is, there
fore, indeiDendent of the first object, the one from which it was
derived. Royce *s confusion here arises from his failure to
CunnTngham', lA'RA 433.
44. Brightman, Art. (194,3)^ 4.
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realize that the idea, now considered as an object, is not
independent of the original object from which it was derived,
bnt is independent of another idea formed about it. The real-
ist admits that the idea is denendent on the object, bu.t insists
that this relation is not reciprocal.
(2) Royce*s second snpportine: argument is that, if ideas
are in every case related to an object, the presence of the
idea would be a sure indication of the reality of the object,
and the being of the object would be so logically dependent
on the existence of the idea that the realistic hypothesis wnuld
be contradicted. The realist admits that many things maybe
discovered about an object by the examination of an idea of it,
even the fact of its existence. What the realist maintains is
that the object is not brough into existence by an idea of it.
This last argument of Royce depends on a false understanding of
independence
.
Perry has shown conclusively that all relations do not
imply dependence. Dependence consists in the existence of a
certain type of relation; independence consists in the absence
of certain types of relations. Relations of whole-part, ex-
clusive causation, implying, being exclusively implied, involve
dependence while other relations do not. The independence
which realists accord their objects consists in relations which
leave the object as i t was before the relation. The realist
sim''^ly maintains that the object would exist whether anyone iaiew
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chang'e in the object, but the idea must vanish or chan^?e if” i t
is to be a true idea of the object. The realist noints out
that 'Oie decree and manner in which the self's ideas influence
their objects is quite different from 1he manner and deerree of
the object's influence on ideas.
Thus it is shown that the most important steu in Royce's
dialectic is not altogether Justifiable.
ii • World of Many or One. Once it is admitted that all
relations do not involve deuendenee, the realist is free to
declare his world Many or One. Perry, ho^i^ver, criticizes
Royce for assuming: that the burden of proof of the existence
of many indeuendent beiners lies with the realist. He states
that the realist simply finds the world to be Many. He alleges
that there is in the world simply the amount of unity and dif-
ference that there seems to be. Perry here overlooks the dif-
ference between phenomenological and ontological reality. Also
it may be said that the analysis which neo-realists preach would
be needless if things are as they appear. If many beings are
the logical outcome of the realist's view, why shouldn't he be
expected to prove their existence?
Royce states that there could be no common characteristics
in 1he realist's world. He forgets here that oualities for the
realist are products of the mind. He also confuses similarity
and identity in his argument.
Royce has definitely defined a hyper-independence. liven
any future dependence of two thiners which were at one time
r'
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independent constitutes at sQl times denendenee
,
nast, nresent,
and future. Although Royce's criticism has not fulfilled its
intentions, it has nevertheless nmde some notable accomiolish-
raen ts,
iii. Royce*3 accomplishme nts . Royce has forced the
realist to define exactly what he means by indenendence , The
outcome of the realist’s definition has been quite contrary to
the commonly accepted euirit of realism. All extra-mental
entities must disapnear and the distance between mind and its
objects is not nearly so erreat as the term independence of idea
and object would seem to imply. Royce has shown that meanings
are the individual’s and that they are not totally beyond the
mind. Royce has ^own that the object cannot be grasped exceut
as the idea is grasued. The part about an object which cannot
be ffrasned by the idea has no existence which could mal<& any
real difference. Royce nroves the folly of uositing the ex-
istence of objects which are out of relation to exnerience. He
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CHAPTTCR V
ROYCr^’S CRITICISM OP PRAGMATIC EPISTEMOIOGY
>
It must be remembered from the beginning that Royce's
polemic does not proceed on the assiimption that pragmatic
epistemoloey is an entirely false view of the theory of
Imowledffe. In all three of his ma,1or criticisms of the
1
doctrine he is care ft: 1 to point ont the trnth of pragmatism.
His fundamental ob.iection is that the doctrine is inadequate as
the whole explanation of truth and reouires suppleraentiner
.
Royce himself at one time was a pure praermatis t and even at the
time of his criticism was a prae-matist to a certain decree.
He always held that, for any truth seeker, the ob.iect of his
belief is also the ob,j 0ct of his will to believe; that judging
is an activity guided by essentially ethical motives; that no
pe rson recognizes any tnith except the truth that embodies his
own purpose. Furthermore, he always conceived of knowledge as
action, althouerh never as mere action; the world of truth for
3
Royce is not a fini^ed world, but is even now beinff made.
An exposition of Royce’s criticism is difficult because
of the fact that in all three of the major sources he does not
consider exactly the, same praemiatism. In his most systematic
treatment, he intends, as he did with realism, to make his pole-
mlc wide -reaching. To accomplish this aim, he attemuts to treat




2, Royce, Art. (1904), 116.
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main Issuas, almost a wre and absolute -nrap-matiam, and largely
disrefrards sneclfie views of nersons holding those views, T'His
method he finds -nartionlarly exnedient in the lierht of the fact
that pragmatism is "ancient, is human, has been faced countless
4
times before and will be considered countless times aerain."
Then, too, criticism of suecial views would denend uuon evnosit'
ion, a too lenethy process.
In his criticism of ura^matism found in The Philosophy
5
of loyalty Royce aims his blows directly at the prasmfiatism of
William James. Quite naturally here he is more specific. In
his criticism found in William Jeme s and Other Essays he treats
more suecifically' instrumentalism, a type of pragmatism of which
6
John Dewey is the chief exponent. Royce, in fact, sometimes
uses one terra and then the other. For the saice of clarity, it
seems wise to treat the criticisms of the two views separately.
Quite naturally there will be o verlappine-. In general
,
the
criticism of one will pertain to the others.
1. CRITICISM OF GFNFRAI. VIEW OF PR'IGMTISM
i. The suir it of ura^mati sm. Ro^Tce besrins his treatment
by an exuosition of what he takes to be the suirit of the view.
In 1he statement of his method, Royce assumes that urapmatl sm
defines the search for truth as identical with the search for
the uractical. His consideration of praermatisra is an attemut
ftoyce. Art. (1§04), 115.
5. Royce, PX, 315-348*
6, Hockinff, TP, 155*

61
to answer the nnestion: "How far is onr knowledge identical
7
with an expression of our practical needs?” Thus it is uraff-
matism as an enistemolog’ical theory that Royce is treating,
A fundamental element of the spirit of pragmatism is that
thought is a deed of the will, or at least a plan of action.
A man thinics about what interests him, about what he needs to
think. Sven the most remote thoughts are for the thinker modes
of conduct.
A thouerht which has no conscious reference
to deed, which involves no ulan of conduct,
which joins nothing that was so far whole,
which involves no play of active attention from
object to object, which voluntarily asserts nothing,
and which denies nothing, is no thouerht at all, but
is a vacant stariner at nothiner in narticular by no- 8
body in uarticular, by nobody who is self-conscious.
The •nhysical gesture of the lecturer indicates how
intensely nractical are the attitudes in which even abstract
thinking nrocesses inevitably express themselves. The thinking
process itself is the consciousness of our adjustment to our
pre sa nt expe ri enc e
.
Royce defines for the pragmatist thoughtful consciousness
in practical terms and then proceeds to define objects in a
similarly pragmatic manner. What is given to the individual
at any one moment is simply the fact of his special momentary
needs for further insight and for further action. What a per-
son thinks or sees, what he makes out of the given is his ex-
pression of himself under the conditions. Royce points out
7. Royce, Art. (1904), 116.
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that this position plainly contradicts the realistic point of
view, which holds that objects of experience are ^iven whole,
with all their properties and relations as objects independent
of will, in "essence extraneous" of consciousness. Over against
realism pragmatism states that what is found in experience is
what it is as an object insofar as it is characterized through
9
a person’s thoughtful deeds. Need is constantly present, so
Bolors a person’s deeds, that a person can never think this or
that of his presented object. The object is the individual’s to
build. Royce supports this conclusion for the pragmatist by
drawing upon the seemingly objective situation of numerical
jomplexity. He attributes counting to the need of counting and
itates that the person counting has not merely found objects, but
pas constructed both the numerical predicate and its relations
10
(ipon the basis of his need for counting.
Royce has thus defined a pure pragmatism, one which without
bupplementing can be held by no one, even though some claim to
lold it. Takinff the doctrine as he has defined it, Royce asks
’fhether it leaves any room for any sort of absolutism or not?
Ian such a doctrine express truth that is eternal of absolutely
authoritative, he asks? Since needs change for every person, and
iiince different persons have differen t ne eds in the same situa-
ion, can there be more than a "fluent realm of transient mean-
ngs"? When a person asserts the truth of a 'diing, can he mean
Acre than the fact that this thing just now meets his conscious
Boyce, Art. (1904), 115.
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need? Royce^s answers are in the negative. Furthermore , these
questions supr^est a need reco^nifred, hut unstated hy the urap’-
matist, which directly contradicts the suirit of uraermatism
11
63
and demands its modification.
ii. Need for c omuani onshiu
. One of the needs of the
individual is that of not only thinkiner for himself, but of
findinp: somebody who either will aprree with him, or who, in
his way of thinicinp:, should aeree with him. The urapmatist
exuresses this need indirectly in several ways.
In the first rlace, the nluralists or the uure -prae-mati sts
e-jToress it in criticism of opposing views. Through their
criticism they desire the victim to see the error of his way
and to come into their fold. They fors-et that they have said
that truth varies for each individual. Sven thoiu^h their
view eliminates the possibility of effective criticism, they
continue their campaign for discipies and sinp loudly the
1 ?
praises of their keen insiP-ht.
In the second Place, the appeal to the doctrine of evo-
lution and to other doctrines that have been accepted by the
public point to the feeline- of this need by the prae-matist.
Praemiatists point out how thoug-ht in general, the specia!!
categories of thought, categories such as obiectivity, truth
and reality, are products of evolution, a process which is
determined by need, stimulation, environment, growth, of the
human organism. Furthermore, the processes of thinking, ac-
knowledgment of this or that object’s reality, progress of
ll. Royce* Art. f “1 504 ) 1 ? 6
•
1??. Rovee, Art. (]904), 1?6.
!««• * j "I'. i'” , , I ' «• i n, * t~ ) .
" *




.- r I* : 'i-




. . ji- i idem j •: ? »:•
f'Tj ' . ‘':£}berf, ' ' ' v, "
. ? ; o '“ Of ' .
'













r i. r r ; \, p^ jJ i








, r ^ ^ R’j ( "f t j • ^
".p “
.t'Vf'iv ' '-ir. => r' :••/.; jj | ' •:rt




' ;«dff i. . i 1 1: ‘
•
•jlsl’ ftTifffvj ) r ^.v -
.
•
, r i j; ,r 't; r- ^ /
,
. f • -.
-.,= :.T











<1 J” .' tj i- 5 ’.ft?. . •. . »"
'












J i:'i ^ rr i '\.< X}-!’ ; vf
* •',























-_ . r f ;
.






science, systems of nhl i osopher s are simnly forms of ad ,'^ns tm<®nt
to the environment, Conseonently it is a tribute to nraffmatism '
that it should come in line with natural history, that it
should he thorouj?hly "modern”. Praarmatists reason that, since
evolution is accented, since nraa-matism is colollary of evo-
lution, nraermatism should he accented.
Here the n raemfiati st is inconsistent. If a nerson is a
praarmatlst, he must say that the doctrine of evolution is true
as the oh.iect of his nresent conscious constructive thoup-ht,
which conceives of evolution as true, because of the need to
conceive of it as true. In this case uraemiatism is stated
first and the doctrine, stated in the nraermatic terms, is
incanahle of lendins- "hack: any of its borrowed authority to
furnish a warrant for your (the) belief in the very doctrine
13
called uraemia ti sm.
"
If the nrae'matist claims that the doctrine of evolution
is universally valid as a result of modern science and that
urae‘mati am -follows from it, he has abandoned urae-matiam and has
become a realist or an absolutist. Thus in two ways the anneal
to evolution weaKens the nrae-matic nosition. It shows on the
one hand, his need for comnarisons, and on the other hand, nroves
incapable of lending any sunnort.
iii. Weed of something valuable as a standard . The ngra-
natist needs not only to have comnanionshin in his belief, but
to be able to give his ,1udgments authority. He needs not only
to express himself as he now is, but to lay down a rule that
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ar)T)lies to himself at other times and for other selves also.
He finds an "one^ht" in his eTnerience and desires to -Peel that
his need "onp'ht" to he what it is. He looks beyond himself to
something' for control.
When the nraermatist sneaks, he sneaks as one havini? this
authority. He states that his account of the Tirocess of .iuds'-
ment and of the relations of a jnde'ment to its oh,1ects is a
sound and true account. As has been Drevionsly stated in
another connection, the statemsnt of the truth of his system
contradicts his definition of truth. If the nragrmatist teaches
15
truth, he does more than assume his needful inner attitudes.
According to his definition, he can interest nobody or can re-
fute nobody.
Royce states that in order to g'ive iudp'ments any w^^rrant,
the individual must make an arnoeal to somebody else or to some
standard. If 1he nraermatist denies the need of such an anneal,
he merely asserts that the individual ousrht not to make it; his
denial will anneal to a judp-ment nassed on consciousness in
greneral
. In his denial that there is an external anneal, the
nrap’matist unconsciously makes tliat apneal and nerforms the
action, the existence of which he- has denied.
In the fnal stae-e of his consideration of the need for the
truth-seeker’s external reference, Royce states his own view.
He shows that it nrovides the necessary’’ sunnlement to pras-matism
This stae-e is an indirect criticiau which he ma^es bv nointiner
1^. Royce, Art. (1904), 131.
15, Royce, Art, (19 04), 134.
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out the necessity of holdings his view as onriosed to -Draffyiatism.
Royce contends that the nerson who believes in the truth
of his .Indfirment believes imnJicitly two further thin/?s; ( 1 ) that
there is another point of view from which this same object is
viewed; and (2) that this other noint of view, not merely a
cony of his own, is related in snch a way to his own view that
each oPP'ht to a<?ree or confirm each other. This other self
cannot be a realistic outer and indenendent object, hot is a
constructive self, ”lik:e itself, yet other than its nresent
self -- its own companion o-p its own extension and wider ex-
16
nression. In contradiction of the nraffraatist, the truth of
a juds:raent is not a mere construction of the nresent moment,
but belongs to- the "unity of the various cons triic ti ve nrocesses
of momentary selves", all of which are different reflections
of the nurnosa shared by each, so that, even in variety, they
17
are one.
The "ou^ht", in as^reemen t wi th Royce view, i s as the
object of "one self-possessed and inclusive Insierht such that
it remains invariant whatever ofher points of view you attempt
18
to conceive added to it.^ If this self does not exist, pr®«?-
mati sm can assart nolhin/?, and deny nothiner, and stands in the
nresence of no ffonuine reality.
16. Royce, Art. (1904], 156.
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P, CPTTTOTSM 01? TNSTPU^'^NTAITSM
Royc© finds instriimentalism not so mnch false as inade-
onate in defining truth. Instrumentalism defines truth as the
valne belonging' to certain Ideas insofar as these ideas are bio-
logical functions of the human organism and usycholoerical
functions whereby choices are directed and successes attained.
Rovce lumus together as fiindamentally the same, instrumentalism,
19 ^
humanism, and nr aermatism, even thous-h instrumentalism is
more correctly described as a tyne of nrasrmatism, the main er-
nonent of which is John Dewey.
i . Inadequacy in reporting fac ts of h isto ry of sci enc e
«
According to instrumental! sm ^ s viewnoint, the truth of Newton's
discovery of the theory of gravitation erists insofar as, after
hard work and long waiting, his Ideas enabled him to c ontio 1
and to nredict certain of his own eTueriences of the facts of
nature. This same theory is true today for other peonle, becausi
it has successfully guided and still guides observations and
experiences. Newton, however, is now dead; his ideas as usy-
chological functions died with him, Wherein consists the
historical truth that Newton ever lived or that other men used
his theories? This truth does not consist in the success In
using the ideal instruments in uttering these assertions. The
truth exists in much more than can be internreted in terms of
success
.
The truth that any historical events ever haupened, the
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truth of uast time or futiira timo, the truth of success
f exceut in use of uresent Instruments for transient control
of •oassins' exuerience chance to succeed) are true, hut their
truth cannot exist in the instrumental xalue which any man
20
exueriences.
i i . Inahili ty of uerson to exuerience success of
anothe r. No man can exuerience any success hut his own or
any instruments hut his own. The fact that a man obtains
empirical truth through usiner his ideas as instruments to
ffuide and control his own exnerience is true as a reuort
of the objective constitution of a certain totality of
facts which are called human experiences. It is true in a
sense which no man can ever test by the empirical success of
his own ideas. If there is truth in instrumentalism^ it fol-
lows from the facts of the general course of history, of evo-
lution, and of human experiences, all of which transcend
?1
every man*s experience, success or verification.
3. CRTTTCTSM OF PRAGMTTSM
i. Jame 8* of tru^. Royce does not attempt
a complete exposition of James* theory of truth, hut he maices
use of the antithesis between his views and James’ to aid in
the exposition of his own view. James bealns his theory by
accepting the classical definition of truth as the ag-reement
of ideas with reality. In some cases ideas apree with, real
80. Royce, Art. (1911), 8i 8-819.
81. Royce, Art. fl9]l), 880-888.
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things "by coDyiner them, hut Jemes recoemiTies this power ns a
SP.
limiteci one. The word' true becomes for James the name for
whatever idea starts the verification nrocess. True ideas are
those which are found -nersonally convenient; successful, ey-
uedient to treat as verifiable. In essence the truth of an
idea is its success in yielding what James calls "the cash
vaDues in terms of eTuerience,”
James does not state, however, what success is, *Royce contends
that the loyal are the only human beinys who have any reason-
able hope of success. This exuerience of loyalty offers to
Royce the first suyyestion of a vulnerable point in James^ view
ii. Bxpe rience of loyal are not loyal for
their own personal success or for the mere collection of their
private experiences of personal thrills. The cause is a "cer-
tain superhuman unity of the ideal life of a free community."
Moreover, heroes who die for a cause, do not experience any
true cash value, but do so out of loyalty. Often the success
of the cause for which they die can be experienced only by
future yen er at ions. The loyal serve a real whole of life, "an
experiential value too rich for any expression in merely mo-
P4
mentary terms,"
i i i , Inadequacy of expediency as a definition of truth.
Truth cannot be defined in terms of a collection of human
experiences of personal expediency. Royce uses the situation
of the witness in Ihe court to indicate that 1he truth of the
witness* statement will not mean the same as the expediency
f
•
n • t y f V ^ . 0 ;, *£ i d
o<.
I' vf 'Cf pj 'fToor-f ^ vvj- uiT .^-rc; /©l.'mJir
•''
I f-
.7^ f).:> A .•„ - j“ C- - T t.t ] i - .A?r'^r I
t » • * • ’n -• 0 V T' - j. ' .Tr*t J '0.1.^V' f c o 'ij
r.*'’
’'













"A -y'.'.r-. .1 1
*
' t ^
• • ' ^ .
'.
1 V r M 0 ftr T' ; '} • r C.'V
’)• ' ‘ i) ’ ? *> • r>r> •r :• /' i - f ‘ 0 t
f
/ .’ \A, •;.- ... r‘




( :' • \..' r:} f'r.* .T ixACij
• ^ •V; r r
. o r.
-'
1 ). -i ' f ' /. f .; ^ i, f i; ^,,1 e-'xj ' ' : J;-
: tn» OC '^,., 0 f(*- V-' -- r. '.: n< ’ !’ ' ‘A’ •< "}: '< .•: !'.; f : ;. h
i;’ -'.• r :
' r or ^ '
• .1'














'? ''f T *• •'> ir. IM ..-'f A:! ;:w.. tJ t









; f f jyj •rq;
#*
1 IL » - ,












r.t^ r > r "r- 1. ;.; j. :r, <*v
'-.
f
T j ‘j c ci'^ : y«. !.7' , ' rof^-xc^l





, ? . ' r- .0 * ' 1 I. V . I'll"






r- 1 ^ ^ '.
. f
»
-• t i ' . r
,
. t




r. ‘tor r 1 1 -t
. L • f "! V •: • rr»4-
-re’ '".i". •
^
r i i- V I*.' t " nr ’ i . r r
vCT -. f j t.r
’
^'(^ vr'jf;:I ‘f, tr noi ^ V *** r r • • ;; i 'u* f’ •* < ^
u - . J
.
'
C ^ . J . ; ^ J { < ' P I. r AC r:fDrrel*:^'*xi^ !
^ r:i.: AfU ’Ji uiy'; ot i; i •r.t ;'v pn.J
'( « f'l. TM. e[niWl’4Wii |T -.' '






oither to Himself or to th^ Plaintiff or to the defendant
regardless of any conseonences whatsoever whiph may follow
70
from his statement. The truth in this case is a simple truth
25
about the witness* own uersonal uast exuerlenee.
iv. Existence of human experience as a whole. Royce
points out the doctrine's inadeouacy in maicingr the assertion:
"Human exuerience, "taicen as a totality offsets, exists."
Yet the Thole frameworic of natural science deuends on the
truth of this assertion. No individual man has verified, or
ever will verify that assertion. James may conceive of this
case as one of trading: on credit. The credit similie is in-
adequate because the verification which would pay the cash,
would be a payment in the form of such human experience as no
ordinary man possesses. The verifier of the assertion is nec-
essarily a superhuman being, "a union of the empirical lives of
many men in the complex of a single exuer ience . " This being
26
must have a conspectus of nast, uresent and future.
V. Existence of " long-run". James would reply that human
exuerience exists in its entirety, merely because, in the long-
run, the belief is congruous with our current and uurely per-
sonal exuerience, and is, therefore, an expedient idea. This
statement is subject to "ftie same criticism to which the prag-
matist on the witness stand was. feeling a belief expedient
is merely a scrap of uersonal biography.
Royce asics the ouestion concerning when one experiences the
85. Royce, PL, 331-334.
26. Royce, PL, 334-337.
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form of the consnectns of an individual's whole life — a
consToectus available only to an essentially super-human type
27
of consciousness.
Royce concludes this phase by saying: that the attainment
of truth is a Ttractical process -which means success, but that
the genuine success that individuals demand is an ethical
success,
vi , Failure of pragmatism to give "cash" . In James*
figure of a business enterprise "cash” represents success in
fulfilling of need. Royce frankly states that praermatism
must confess bankruptcy in concern of cash navments of sieni-
ficant truth. It, however, does not gro into the hands of the
real receiver, for it does not like anythin? appearing too ab-
solute. Then, too, it uroposes to ero on doin? business under
the old style and title of truth.
Thus Royce thoroughly criticises praermatism and show;s that
it is an incomplete account of truth.
27. Royce, -krt. (1911), 214.
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f^STTMATE OF ROYCS'S CRITICTSM OF PRAGM.ATTC
EPISTEMOLOGY
Royc©*3 criticism of pragmatic ©pistomology has hy no
means received such attention as that received by his criticism
of realistic enistemology. Perhaps this situation results from
the fact that his criticism of rragmatism is not so nnione, so
seemin«2rly conclusive, or so wide-reaching as his criticism of
realism. This relatively small amount of response, however,
does not ,justify the conclusion that this criticism is of
lesser valne. It does, however, make necessary a different
method for evalnatina- the criticism of praffmatisra. VThereas
many direct treatments were cited before reaching the final
evaluation of the criticism of realism, it is necessary in the
case of his criticism of pragma tism to proceed to a direct ew-
amination of his arguments against the doctrine.
1. CRITICISM OP GENERAL VIEW OP PRAGMATISM
»
i. Need for c om-pan ion shiT). wiHipm James admits the
nragmatist* s desire for comnani onshin, bnt gives it an en-
tirely different interoretation to that of Royce. Whereas
Royce internrets the nrae-matist ' s desire for companionship as
the recognition of the fact that he ouffht to be believed, James
says that, because men are erreffarious, they seek to spread thei
beliefs, to awaken imitation. Since the nraermatist finds a
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belief satisfactory, He reasons that th9 belief may "be sati^-
factory for another and forthwith seeKS converts. The believer
will hold nx) his "siihiect end of a truth, which v;ill be a
truth objective and irreversible if the reality holds up the
1
object end by being: itself uresent simultaneously."
Sayinp that man is gregarious is by no means an explan-
y
ation of the need for companionship in his belief. It is
merely a description. It is similar to explaining: anerer by
an "ans:er instinct" or to saying that a "law uerforms an
action." The mere fact that men are erreerarious would not ex-
plain the pragmatist* s intense "evangelism" or his trenchant
criticism of other views. The uragraatist has no right to imply
that all peonle have the same needs or that the same needs may
be fulfilled or satisfied by the same means. The evangelism of
the uragmatism, in "Hie light of his own definition, must be
very mild. If his would-be-convert says that he has different
needs or that some other theory is fulfilling his needs, the
pragmatist must gracefully retreat or else be guilty of trying
to persuade someone to accent a falsehood.
The pragmatist may say that the satisfaction he derives
from his theory is not complete until he has uroclaimed i t to
others and has allowed them to hear the good news and hence he
V
feels a further need - that of evangelization. If he says this
he says also that truth is that which the winner of the battle
among evangelists proclaims and is not the practical conseouenc
for anyone but for that winner.
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ThTis the -Draffmatist contradicts his original dafini ti on
. The ra
is no way out, as these supnortine: areruments show, for the
praematist. It seems that Royce has shown oonclusively that
the nrae-raatist ’ 8 need for companion shin and his means of ex-
nressine: that need reveal a weakness of the doctrine when com-
pared with the pragmatist's definition of truth.
ii , Need of something valuable as a standard.
Royce noints out that the statement of the truth of nrasrmatism
contradicts its definition of truth. James comnares this ob-
jection to the classical one concernins’ the scentical nosition-
that one do<?mati?:es in ernressine’ the nosition. James states
that the fact that a fi'reat amount of scepticism still exists
should frierhten the rationalists concernini? the validity of
the objection. Scepticism is a live mental attitude of refus-
ing to conclude, a "nermanent tomor of will, renewins: itself
2
in detail toward each successive thesis that is offered." The
consistent sceptic never puts scepticism into formal statement.
James contends that pragmatist's act of utterance exem-
plifies the matter he utters. He utters this: "truth is an
attribute of your beliefs; these are attitudes that follow
satisfactions." The ideas around which the satisfactions
cluster are primarily only hynotheses that challensre a belief
or summon a belief to come and taice its stand upon them. The
3
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It cannot be verified until it is first accented. James ad-
mits that this is the logical outcome of the nraermatic doctrine
of truth. The -pragmatist cannot assert that his view except in
the sense in which he -praffma ti cally defines truth, Pratt statej
that the consistent nra^raatist can only exhort and that log:ic-
ally -praffraatism becomes only one of the varieties of relierious
4
exToerience rather than a serious -philosouhical doctrine.
James and Schiller, however, are the only pragmatist*
s
who admit that -pragmatism must stand on such flimsy foundation.
They admit that they have no losrical ria^ht to say that their
view should be acce-pted but yet they assume that it should.
Most -pragmatists claim that their doctrine is true in a sense
dee-per than the pragmatic truth and even James and Schiller are
not consistent in their treatment of the matter and, as Royce
shows, contradict themselves. Pratt states that the pragmatist
must be reminded that an unverified claim is not yet true.
75
5
Therefore, praprraatisra is both true and false at the same tine,
Pratt states, as Royce does, that pragmatists are not satisfied
that their doctrine be accepted; they want to show. that it
ought to be accented, that some external reference demands the
acce-ptance of the view. Royce riBxes it evident that the prag-
matist must either give up his doctrine of truth; or else
cease claiming that it is true and should be accepted.
Royce 's conclusion that judgments must make an external
a-D-peal to somebody else or to some standard for their warrant
4. Pratt, WTP, 127.
5. Ibid., 3 27.
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and that this standard mnst be more than the -nractical conse-
oiiences of the idea under consideration is further f?upportie<t
states that 'ivhen
by Hocking;'^a belief is chosen that it ceases to be a belief.
The susuicion that the will has tinned the balances of evidence
brands a chosen hynothesi s, as sub.iective. But a belief, whether
satisfactory in successful conseauences
,
is the reference of
the mind to an obiect assumed real and objective, something
6
that ouerht to be believed in. A nerson accents as true some-
thing which deserves belief or accentance.
Royce^s arenment is further strengthened by that of Dr.
E. S, Brightraan. After a nujrfber of ideas have nroven satis-
factory or successful, there is still some thine needed to es-
tablish truth. Christian Science, Roman Catholicism, and
Buddhisim all soothe and nroduce successful conseauences. Yet
7
all cannot be true unless "truth is a chaotic nonsense. What
further criterion will decide amoni? these seemine: contradiction
James at times seems to say that the nrinclnle of
consistency is the final criterion for establishiner truth. In
"What Prae-matism Means" James states:
II?
If tbeoloffical ideas nrove to have a value
for concrete life, they will be true for praffma-
tism in a sense of being ffood for so much. For
how much more they are true will deuend on their
relations to other truths that also have to be
acknowl ede-ed.
James has set up a final standard which uartially destroys
his first nrinciple. Many things which prove successful or
6. Hockiner, TP, 163.
7. Briffhtman, RY, 73.
B. James, Art, (1907) 213.
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•practical or satisfylner must "be surrendered when it is demanded
that they he consistent vrith one another.
A, W. Moore states that the praemistist finds a standard
which ffives consistency and -permanenee in -pur-pose. This nnr-
•pose is not some fixed and ahsol’ute p'ur'oose. It is not trying
to com-niete itself as an inde'oendent thinsr, hnt is finding com-
pletion as it nrovides an outlet for the activities which are
seeking: expression through it. Moore states that an anneal to
an i^ltimate nurnose imnlies a •purpose already made for the use.
To Moore the presence of conflict is evidence that there is
no complete purpose. A part of the struse-le is to construct
a purpose, not to decide between purposes already formed,
Roth absolutist and pragmatist ae-ree that the pumose throuerh
which this conflict finds its solution is the Plan which srives
freest and most harmonious outlets to conflicting: activities.
Moore contends that the absolutely Permanent in the form of
purpose is only a hypostati^ed abstraction of fhe -function of
purposing:. For the prag:matist the sense of freedom and har-
mony is not a bare detached feeling: but is the issue of a
process of purposing: and thinking:, including' experimentation
and verification based on results of previous thoug:ht and act-
ion, involving many individual minds and much of the material
9
0 f the wo rid .
Moore has still stated no standard when he acclaims pur-
pose as the standard for measuring truth. If there is any
9. Moore, Art, (1906), 63^-36.
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T>‘orr)os« whioh will decide between conflicting views, there
must be some mirro se -which includes all of the corf! ic tine-
views. Otherwise there wculd still be a conflict between
r-urnoses, A prrrose which includes all leads strais-ht to
the absolute which Moore and all nraffmatists detest.
All of these arernments ^ow conclusively that tr-uth is
conformity to an ought in eTperience and demands an external
standard, Trrth and' falsity, to be sure, are relative to
insight, to exnerience, to life, to action, to the construct-
ions which pragmatism emphasizes. But unless these construct-
ions are what they 'ought to be, they are not true, Rovce then
takes a leap and says that there is one point of view; from
which the ought is known -
known not as simply a single, transient,
unstable, chance point of view, but as the
obiect of one self-possessed and inclusive
insight such that it remains invariant
whatever other points of view are added to
y
Here the Absolute at last stands.
Royce has shown clearly that pragnmtism needs supplementing
Tt is correct in establishing a method of discovering truth,
but is i)^omplete in telling what truth is. Tt is doubtful
whether Royce is correct in prescribing what kind of standard
or absolute is needed. Perhaps a theistic explanation will be
as capable of giving the needed standard as the pantheistic one*
Nevertheless, regardless of whether Royce is .justified in pre-
scribing his brand of absolute or not, he has revealed pragma t-
ism* 3 weakness,
10. Royce, Art. (1904). 141.
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8 . CRTTICTSM OP INSTRUiraWTALTSM
Professor Royeo considers that the indisoensableness to
the instniraentalis t theories of truth of a recog’nition of the
social implication of ideas and beliefs is fatal to the in-
strumental concention. John Dewey, the view's foremost ex-
11
ponent, considers it the view's essense. Dewey first at-
tempts in his reoly to Royce's criticism to show that Royce ' s
logical success consists in attributing certain ideas which are
foreign in fact and logic to 1iie instrumentalist position.
Royce, for instance, uses the term "psychological” to desiffnate
the merely private, the merely personal, and even at times the
12
internal transient states of consciousness.
i • Inadequacy of rerorting the facts of history of
science . Rojree considers the instrumentalist's account of
"psychological" functions tri^e as far as they go, but that its
truth must be so as a rerxDrt of the objective totality of facts
called human experience. Therefore, it is true in a sense in
which no man can test by emuirical success of his own ideas a
means of controlling his own experience. Also, the facts about
history, evolution, human exuerience are true as facts which
transcend eveiy individual's verification.
Dewey denies that he meant the narrow, exclusive sense to
individual exuerience. Dewey reminds Royce that one of the
most rudimentary traits of a live creature is its continuity
with a racial organic life "just as that of an environment is
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- gits s-patial diversity and its temroral perdurance," Life
individuates itself, and particular individuals arpear and
disappear. But individuation is a trait of life and not the
i
mystery of a private, isolated somewhat which destroys all
natural traits of life.
Dewey contends that the truth of the Newtonian conception
lies in the fact that it enables predictions, ffives control,
facilitates intercourse, pnjides new observations and reflect-
ions. But Royce says that Newton's ideas as psychological
functions died with him and his earthly experience ceased with
his death. Wherein lies the historical fact that Newton ex-
isted or that countless other men v;hom his theories are said
14
to have guided lived?
The obvious answer, Perry says, is that Newton cannot be
dead unless he lived, but he admits that this is not what Royce
has in mind. Dewey states that there is no apriori compulsion
to formulate conceptions or beliefs regarding Newton. Indeed
the vast ma.-jority of natural happeniners so by without being
reflected upon. ’/Then a specific need of thinking arrives, a
specific hypothesis emerges in response to the need and the
success of the hypothesis yields the truth. The c ontinuit y and
similarity of experience and sociable relationships make veri-
fication possible.
Dewey contends that Royce presupposes the completely
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of other inttivittuaia. Yet the prohlem is not eventual
"verification of our ideas about his ideas but of our haviner
15
any ideas about his ideas.” To be sure, certain images, a
certain emotional tone of inward landscape, may be said to
have died with Newton. But to claim that his idea of gravi-
tation as a vital fi^nction died is to twist the facts, Newton
acted through his theorv, "lived it out so adequately that it
became an integral uart of the activities of educated men and
16
scientific inquirers throughout the civilized world." The
transmissive oueration is one of the things that is included
in the conceution of "success” of a vital fiinction. Dewey
states that one is not correctly grivin? the standuoint of in-
strumentalism when one conceives the vital function as some-
thing which renders the transmissive function impossible."
Dewey contends that Royce falls bacic on the very urocedure
of instrumentalism when he sueaics of countless multitudes of
sufferings and doings of Newton about which can be made no
Intelligble statement. Dewey holds that the Absolute does not
help explain non-existent truths. He maintains that Royce is
not entitled to use a different procedure in arrivinsr at the
Absolute from that which enabled belief in certain things about
Newton, If Ihe trsnsmissive bearings of life suffice in the
case of Newton to enable certain intellectual formulations to
live while others died, why, if the Absolute exists, should "we
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of Ite 9xistf9nc0 on© that works ontnndar t©sts?" ' Thrs
Dowoy considers that he has rendered Royce's criticism con-
cernine* instrumentalism's inadeqtiacy in rerortinff the facts
of the history of science invalid.
Dewey has not shown that verification of the past consti-
tutes the truth of the past. He has no doubt shewn why and how
the truth maybe discovered: fl) life is contimi.ous and is so
related to its uarts- that exneriences may be traced. (2) Cer-
tain ideas are so vital and make such Im-nresaions that they
become integral narts of the activities of educated men and
scientific innuirers of the whole world. (.’5) The transmissive
function is one of the things included in the success of a
vital function. Dewey still has not shown his theory adequate
to ©xuress the sense in which 1he statement of the historic
erisode of Newton's theory itself is true. It is not en oueh
to say that the truth lies in 1he success of a hypothesis
concerning the fo nation of the theory.
An illustration will suffice to suuioort Royce's claim of
instrumentalism's Inadenuacy. Assume that a man has a need to
discover the exact conditions under which Newton formed his
theory. One of the details for which he is searchiner is the
location of the exact spot where the theory was formed. He
makes a hypothesis and beslns the process of verification.
Because of the continuity of human exuerience, he is able to
trace the matter back, "livery piece of available infbrmation
shows that Newton's home was on L street. This conclusion is
17. Dewey, Art. ( 1^12 ) , 78.
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successful in allowing oth®r riredietions and leading to
discovery of other facts. The hypothesis has "been veri-
fied and has heen acclaimed successful. But suppose that there i
is another person far away who icnows a bit of evidence that
shows conclusively that the spot was on M street. This bit of
j
evidence has been a family secret passed on by the eldest son
of each veneration. It could never be verfied except by this
one man because Newton slipped away in the dark and was seen
only by this one man. He knows about the theory which has been
verified, but he does not care to enlivhten anyone. Can the
instrumentalist call his verified theory truth when there is an
idea in existence which contradicts the theory? There are
numbers of experiences which occirr in such a private manner
that they could never be verified except by the person having
them. He knows the truth of those ideas whether they are or
can be verified by others. If the transmissive function is
necessary or is a characteristic of successft^l ideas, it may be
concluded that some of the most successful ideas are ideas whiol
do not^conforra to fact and that some of the ideas which do con-
form to fact are most unsuccessful. It seems that Dewey has
not made ineffective Royce's dialectic on this point. Royce^s
criticism that the facts of history are true in a different
sense from mere verification is a valid criticism.
ii . Inability of person to experience success of another.
Royce contends that truth cannot be traded on credit because
one cannot experience the success of another. Consistently
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instriimentalisTi nrust identify the act of erivlner credit with
trnth and, therefore, anything* is tri^e which it is expedient
to "believe, Dewey states that Royce's los-lc is: either the
assertion that T accent as trne is true already or else hy its
truth I mean simply that I give credit to it. The former al-
ternative surrenders instrumentalism; the latter nuts it in
18
the position of making truth offhand. Dewey states that
there are hundreds of alternatives besides these two. Dewey
claims that the accepting of credit is su"b.iect to precisely
the same sort of tests - of working under cond.it ions - as
acceptance on the basis of more direct personal verification.
What is indicated is that the social medium of life is contin-
uous as it has been seen to be. One has verified in innumer-
able cases that under the conditions one may trust to the ex-
19
perience and report of others. Also there is the specific
verification, the working of the acceptance of this particular
belief upon credit and authority of some particular e-roup of
persons. One accents not arbitrarily, but on probation.
Dewey maxes a subtle point when he asxs what would follow
if truth or falsity already belongs to a proposition but can-
not be verified? What attitude would follow? Accordine* to
Royce*s viewpoint the only courses open would be either to ac-
cent or reject arbitrarily by whim. Dewey contends that the
dilemna into which Royce tries to force the instrumentalist
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scepticism as to what is truth or falsity of most thinffs in
history or els© "the loosest so-s s-you-please most wayward
oninionatedness." Dewey states that the concention of social
credit is sisrnificant because it sueerests that uersonal ex-ner-
ience is itself social in origin, matter, and outloolc.
It seems that Dewey has annulled the validity of Royce's
criticism of "acceutinff truth on credit." The prae-matist ac-
cepts the idea as true in the sense that he first defined truth;
j
he accepts ideas as verifiable. If one accents the idea that
the pragma tist may trade ideas as true on credit, Royce's crit-
icism about verification of the existence of human exuerience
as a whole and his criticism of the existence of the lonff-run
are not valid criticisms.
3. CRTTICTSM OT?’ PRAflMATTSM
i. Bxrerience of loyalty^ In answer to Royce's criticism
that the loyal do not seek in exnerienti al terms the cash value
3f their devotion, pragmatism maintains that it does not say
that all that is accented as true must be canable of beiner veri-
fied in a nerson's life time or that it could be verified by any
>ne nerson. The "cause", moreover, is an abstraction which ex-
ists only as a g^oal. What the individual can exnerience is his
Individual nart in makine: the abstraction a reality. It is not
.nconsi stent with nrag-matism that many of the individual's
do
lotivities'^no t have a cash value. Pragmatism would nrobably say
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. ^ . I
0T-n«ri.«nc« have a cash valije. In other words, it is expedient
that many of life's experiences have no cash valne . It seems
that this ohjection is not a valid one.
li. Inadeqi^acy of ex^^edi ency as a definition of trnth.
Royce makes it evident that the criterion of exTiediency is not
adeqpate as a definition of trnth, Snppose that two men are
spspected of committing: a crime on a certain eveninff. It is
known definitely that- one of the two men committed 1he crime.
One finds it expedient to say that he was a hundred miles away
from the scene. The other finds it expedient to say that he
was with a friend who has since died and cannot g-ive testimony.
Are both men to he called tmthful hecapse they have expressed
what was expedient. What is wanted in their testimony is an
exact accopnt of their past experience.
The real anestion concerning: this objection is whether any
praematist has considered expediency as a spfficient criterion
for the trpth . James says:
I start with two thing:s, the objective facts
and the claims, and indicate which claims, the
facts being: there, will work spccessfully as the
latter's substitptes and which will not. I call
the former claims trne.^^
Pragmiatism does not mean to disreg’ard the facts of» the case.
It mpst be remembered that Royce 's .ipdg*ment concerning* exped-
iency applies only to those pragmati sts who dlsreg*ard the facts.
i i i . ten ce of hnman exper i e_n ce_ai^ 1 e.
Briffhtman cites this arg'pment of Royce as a valid ob.iectlon to
[>rag*matism. He states that no reasonable mind can donbt that
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exiDerience of Tnany men really exiRts",
e says would annear to he he vend the reach
12
of nraffmatic verification. The validity of this oh .lection de-j
pends on the strength of the ability to trade ideae on credit.
If Ideas may he traded on credit, the oh.iection is not valid.
The trading of ideas on credit has been treated under the
criticism of instrumentalism and has been shown to he valid; i .
iv. Sri stance of "long run ." The nrae-matist says that
he may believe that many men erist because, in the "Ion? run",
this belief is coneruous with current and. nurely nersonal er-
nerience. Royce asics the embarrassing auestion eoncerniner when
one exneriences the lone: run - at the bes'innins- of the lone: run,
when the end is not yet, or at Ihe end, when one forc-ets. Rove<
states that to anneal to the "long n:n" is to anneal to an st-
perience which one never has. Rovee sneafcs as if the lone run
were a real beiner rather than a logical creation which is an
abstraction made from observation of all experience, not from
merely personal exnerience. Since tradinf? on credit is legiti-
mate, the lone: run may exist for the nraemnatist.
'P'^a.gmati sm t o give "cash" . This oh.iection
contains nolhing which has not been treated in previous ob-
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VI. SUffivIAPV and conciitstons
1. Prs.frmfltists may be realists end still be consistent.
Most pragmatists are realists in the fact that they posit a
reality which exists whether it is known or not. Mesnine’ for
the pragmatist is largely stibiectiTe while it is ob.iective
for the realist. Both realists and pra(?matists revolt ae-ainst
idealism.
2. Royce’s criticism has certain limitations which
keen it from being final.
i. The realist does not mean absence of relations
by Independence, but only certain kinds of
rel ati ons
.
ii. Indenendence between idea and obiect is not
a mnttial relation. The ob,iect is indenendent
of the idea, bnt the idea is not indenendent
of the object.
iii.Royce largely nreclndes the nossibility of
the existence of many indenendent beings in his
definition of indenendence
.
iv. The existence of common characteristics amona:
objects denends on an indenendent element, mind.
Royce has confnsed similarity with identity.
Regardless of these defects, Royce’s criticism has accomplished
Important things.
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carefully what he means hy Independence.
This definition, to exempt itself from
Royee*s dialectic, trrns opt to reveal that
ideas and oh.iects are more related than nn-
related.
ii. Royce has shown that the ob^iect cannot be
ffrasped until the idea is first g-rasped.
iii. He hag exposed the' folly of positing
Independent reals beyond and unliJce
. experience.
3. Royce has dealt pragmatism a heavy blow. He has shown
that it is a true theory as far as it goes, but that it does
not go far enough. Tt is correct as a method for obtaining
truth but not as a definition of truth. Qu-’ te a number of
arguments show that the pragmatist cannot be consistent until
he transforms his definition of- truth.
1. ' The pragmatist, in his need for companionship
and in his attempt to get it, assumes that his
doctrine is true in a sense not lustified by
his definition of truth.
ii . The recognition of an "ought” in experience




Instrumentalism I s inadequate in reporting
the facts of history.
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praemntipm. Tt seems that the praermatlst may trade ideas as
trTie if he is carefTTl to he eonsi stent with his definition of
trnth. If truths may he accented as verifiable wither t per-
sonal experience, Royce^s criticism based on the experience
of the ”lonc-rrn” and the "existence of human exToerience as
a whole" is not effective.
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